United States Army Command and General S

The urgent requirement for US Army preparedness in conducting urban operations (UO) is very real. As global urbanization continues to increase, the contemporary threat environment makes operations in cities impossible to avoid. The past decade has demonstrated through the American experiences in Mogadishu and Russian experiences in Grozny, less capable forces will attempt to use urban terrain asymmetrically to even the balance of power against technologically superior military forces. While we have always had a serious requirement to conduct urban operations, the very nature of the cold war, which was successful by its deterrence, prevented us from ever having to face the reality of fighting such urban engagements. In the post-cold war era, the U. S. Army is forced to face the realities of fighting in the urban environment. It is not enough to speak of preparing for "future urban operations"; the future is here today and the Army must be prepared to engage in urban operations even as it moves towards the objective force. Being prepared means having solid doctrine, realistic training programs and facilities, and appropriate equipment to ensure success on the urban battlefield when the time comes to fight there. This book asks the question, "Is the US Army adequately preparing for contemporary and future urban operations?" To determine the answer to this question, the book 1) examines the urban threat, 2) analyzes the Army's current and evolving urban operations doctrine, 3) analyzes its urban training and training infrastructure, and 4) determines how effectively equipped the force is for operations in the urban environment. This book determines that while there has been a significant improvement in the Army's urban operations doctrine, the Army still remains under-prepared for urban operations, because it is still not training UO as a joint and combined arms team across the full spectrum of operations. This is in large part due to continued shortfalls in training infrastructure and a lack of UO specific equipment in units. While there are existing plans and funds to correct some of these deficiencies over the next decade, the Army cannot afford to wait. Thus the book concludes that in the near term, the Army must maximize UO training at every level capable in order to validate doctrine, learn how to fight, and develop needed equipment for urban operations.

The term operational reach, an element of operational design, is new to U. S. Army doctrine. Operational reach is not found in the previous edition of the Army's basic operational doctrine, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, published in June 1993. However, the term was recently included in the latest edition published in June 2001, now labeled FM 3-0. The term is also new to joint doctrine, first added in the 1995 addition of Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, under the facets of operational art. Thus, because of the introduction of this new doctrinal term, most Army operational planners may not completely grasp the concept of operational reach and why it is important. Consequently, there is a need to provide a book that fully explains and explores the implications of operational reach. Since doctrine is the source of common understanding, the primary purpose of this study is to determine if current U. S. Army doctrine on operational reach is adequate. In order to accomplish this task, joint doctrine, military theory and history case studies will serve as an analytical framework for examining the concept of operational reach. The research revealed that current Army doctrine on operational reach is inadequate. One of the characteristics of sound doctrine found in TRADOC Regulation 25-36 is "Concise doctrine provides a comprehensive body of thought..." However, the analysis of joint doctrine, military theory, and history provides numerous concepts not included in the Army's current operational manual, FM 3-0. Furthermore, TRADOC Regulation 25-36 also states "Flexible doctrine gives soldiers, leaders, and organizations the leeway to adapt to many different, or changing, circumstances." This passage usually means doctrine should not be overly prescriptive, restricting initiative and innovation. However, to be flexible and adapt to many different, or changing, circumstances, Army planners must have a doctrine that provides more than just a short reference. While doctrine should not have to address every technique, the doctrine on operational reach is clearly lacking the needed breadth to make it adequate. The Army must change doctrine on operational reach. The study discovered that doctrine on operational reach must include the idea of a definitive limit to the decisive employment of military force in every operation. Exceeding this limit will either force an operational pause or lead to culmination. Additionally, the Army must include more concepts on extending operational reach than are currently considered. This will make the doctrine far more comprehensive and flexible.