Office of Air Force History

Operation Overlord, the Normandy invasion-likeWilliam the Conqueror's before it or the Inchon landing afterwards-will long be studied as a classic in military planning, logistics, and operations. Overlord depended to a remarkable degree upon the use of air power in virtually all its forms. A half-century ago, aircraft were primitive vehicles of war compared to the modern attackers of the Gulf War era" with their precision weapons, advanced navigational, sensor systems, and communications. Yet, the airplane still had a profound impact upon the success of the invasion. Simply stated without air power, Normandy would have been impossible.

This monograph recounts the development of air doctrine in the Army air arm from 1917 to 1941. It includes concepts, both strategic and tactical, that emerged during World War I and the period following, up to the entry of the United States intoWorld War II. The study is based primarily on official Air Force records and upon interviews with officers of the air arm who have been especially associated with air doctrine. It was prepared for the USAF Historical Division by Dr. Thomas H. Greer, formerly a member of the Division and presently associate professor of humanities, Michigan State College. A number of changes in, and additions to, the original draft have been madeby members of the Historical Division, notably Mr. Robert T. Finney and Dr. Albert F. Simpson. All such changes and additions have been based upon Historical Division studies and data not available to Dr. Greer when he prepared the basic draft. Both the original draft and the final version were edited by personnel of the Division. Like other Historical Division studies, this history is subject to revision, and additional information or suggested corrections will be welcomed.

Following World War II, the onset of nuclear weapons, long-range jet bombers, and ballistic missiles radically changed American foreign policyand military strategy. The United States Air Force, led by men of far-sighted vision and uncommon dedication, accepted the challenge of organizing and leading a massive research and development effort to build ballistic missiles. In the quarter of a century since, these weapons have constituted one of the three legs of the strategic triad-the basis of America's strategy of deterring nuclear war-yet they have received less attention from the public and within the Air Force than the more glamorous manned bombers of the Strategic Air Command or the missile-launching submarines of the U. S. Navy. This volume attempts to correct the imbalance by telling the story of the development of Air Force ballistic missiles. It concentrates on the first generation of ballistic missiles: the intercontinental Atlas and Titan, and the intermediate range Thor. Although the effort to develop rockets has a longer history than commonly assumed, the modern history spans the relatively short era from 1945 to 1960. During this brief interval, missiles advanced from drawing board to alert status, where the next generation now remains poised to deter war. The author describes the difficulties involved in the technological competition with the Soviets to be first to develop and deploy a ballistic missile force. With innovative leadership, the Air Force succeeded also in overcoming conflict with the Army and Navy, budgetary constraints, administrative complications, and of course formidable engineering problems. Jacob (Jack) Neufeld has done a thoughtful, thorough job of research in an immense amount of documentation. He came to the task with broadexperience in the subject matter. He first joined the history program at Eighth Air Force, Westover Air Force Base, Massachusetts; his initialassignment was to cover the command's ICBMs, including the Titan II and Minuteman, in the annual history. When he came to Washington and joined the Office of Air Force History in 1970, he produced monographs on missiles and space. He also had other diverse assignments, usually in thearea of the history of research, development, and technology generally. Before long he earned a well-deserved reputation as an expert in these fields. In the course of his extensive research, Mr. Neufeld also met and interviewed many of the leading people involved in Air Force science and technology. Although the development of ballistic missiles is largely an administrative history, it is also the story of the herculean efforts of several key individuals. The effort could not have succeeded as it did without the fortuitous appearance on the scene of Trevor Gardner, Gen. Bernard A. Schriever, and Dr. John von Neumann. How these men conceptualized, promoted, and directed the program forms the basis of the story. Additionally, the development of ballistic missiles revolutionized the way the Air Force conducted research and development, having a profound and longlasting effect on how the service acquired weapons of all types. Mr. Neufeld's fascinating history details these important changes in the process of relating how the service conceived, developed, and brought into the arsenal one of the most revolutionary weapons in the long history of warfare.

The introduction of airplanes to warfare led almost from the first to their application in close support of ground forces. The earliest attempts at influencing the outcome of a ground battle from the air were limited by the fragility of the craft engaged and the lack of coherent ideas on themost effective use of what was still a novelty. What began as an expedient, however, has become over nearly ten decades an essential rolefor air power. Taken virtually for granted by troops and aviators today, the employment of air power in this way has been controversial from thefirst instance in which bombs were dropped on ground combatants during the Italo-Turkish war of 1911-1912. Ground and air commanders havediffered over the proper use of aviation; preferences and assumptions on doctrine have evolved in both the ground and air communities; technology has changed air systems and defensive ground weaponry; and with time different systems or techniques have developed in various militaryestablishments for the command and control of ground and air forces operating in concert, for liaison and communications, and for deliveringaerial firepower in support of land forces locked in combat with an enemy. In December 1982, Maj. Gen. Perry McCoy Smith, then the Air Force Director of Plans, asked the Office of Air Force History to prepare a number of case-study volumes on various aspects of air warfare. Col. John A. Warden III, in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, provided funds from the Air Force's Project Warrior Program. With further generous assistance of Dr. Andrew Marshall, then Directorof Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Air Force History Program approached some of the foremost historians in thefield of military aviation to record their assessments as a resource for planning within the Air Force and the Army for several years to come. Each author was asked to produce an original case study on a defined period or subject. The essays were to be based on all relevant publishedliterature and on the key archival documents containing the record of how various air forces actually developed and applied their systems of close air support to ground combat. Each author was also asked to cover certain basic topics: initial doctrine, organization of forces, background andcourses of the air-ground campaigns, communications systems, command and control arrangements, weaponry and technology, and the decisions and people that determined the course of action and shaped its outcome. A concluding retrospect draws generalizations from the experiences presented. The Office of Air Force History believes that this volume will be of substantial value not only to the U. S. Air Force and the U. S. Army, but should also appeal to a wider audience interested in all aspects of military history and contribute to informing the American public about thecharacteristics and the use of air power in all of its aspects.

The historical roots of air superiority date to the First World War, which marked the emergence of the fighter airplane, offensive and defensivefighter doctrine, and the trained fighter pilot. By the end of the war, the Imperial German Air Service had been decisively outfought, and thoughoccasional bitter air combat still occurred, the Allied air arms were free to harass and attack German ground forces wherever and whenever they chose. After the war, there were defense commentators who injudiciously predicted-not for the last time-that the era of dogfighting was over;higher aircraft speeds would make maneuvering air combat a thing of the past. Instead, the lesson of the importance of air superiority was rediscovered in the skies over Spain, and confirmed again throughout the Second World War. Having tenaciously wrested air superiority from the Luftwaffe, the Allies in 1941 went on to achieve genuine air supremacy, a situationacknowledged by General Dwight Eisenhower, who, riding through Normandy after D-Day, remarked to his son: "If I didn't have air supremacy, I wouldn't be here." Sadly, many of these lessons were lost in the post-Second World War era, when technology advances-supersonic design theory, nuclear weapons, and "robot" aircraft-seemed to signal an end to the traditional air-to-air fighter-even though the experience of the Korean War demonstrated that transonic jet combat was not merely possible, but the new normative form of air warfare. Indeed, the fighter airplane underwent a dramatic transformation into a nuclear-armed strike aircraft, now that popular wisdom held that surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles foreshadowed the end of the era of "classic" air combat. That prediction collapsed in the face of the Vietnam war and the experiences of the Middle East. The 1970s witnessed both a revolution in fighter aircraft design (spawned by the technology advances of the 1960s and 1970s) and a return to basics in both design fundamentalsand the training of fighter pilots. Operations in the Falklands war, over the Bekaa Valley, and most recently, during DESERT STORM confirmed not only the benefits of this revolution and rediscovery, but also the enduring importance of air superiority. During DESERT STORM (which occurred while this book was in press) the airmen of the United States Air Force established air superiority overIraq and occupied Kuwait from the outset of the war, defeating the Iraqi air force both in the air and on the ground. By so doing, they created the conditions essential for decisive air war. Strike and support aircraft and helicopters could go about their duties without fear of molestation from enemy aircraft. Iraq's forces, pinned in place, were denied any respite from punishing air attack. Because of coalition air supremacy, coalition land operations could be undertaken with an assurance, speed, and rapidity of pace never before seen in warfare. Bluntly stated, the Gulf war demonstrated that with air superiority, General Norman Schwarzkopf could undertakehis famed "Hail Mary" play. Lacking air superiority, Iraq paid dearly. Its III Corps became vulnerable to air attack-stuck in a traffic jam out of Kuwait City on the "Highway of Death." Air superiority, like democracy itself, must be constantly secured and renewed. In recognition of this, the United States Air Force is developing the F-22 Advanced Tactical Fighter to ensure that America retains its technological edge well into the 21st century. The case studies in this volume, encompassing several major air-to-air battles, eloquently demonstrate why the quest for air superiority remains critically important for today's Air Force.

In 1942 the Allied powers faced the most seriouschallenge to their control of the seas encountered in the Second World War: the menace of the U-boat. Fast, well-armed, and long-ranged, Hitler's submarines attacked shipping throughout the North Atlantic, often within sight of America's coastal towns and cities. Eventually, the combination of intelligence, land and seabasedair power, and surface vessel operations from bothNorth American and British bases ended this threat, making possible the Allied build-up for the invasion of Europe in 1944. This booklet, by A. Timothy Warnock of the Air Force Historical Research Agency, is one of a series tracing selected Army Air Forces activities in the Second World War. It describes the Army Air Forces' contribution to the Battle of the Atlantic from the American Theater. A subsequent bookletwill examine the campaign in the eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Flying radar-equipped long-range patrol planes, AAF airmen demonstrated the value of land-based air power against naval threats. This success has been reaffirmed consistently since the Second World War, from Vietnam and crises such as the Mayaguez incident to operations in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The Harpoon-armed B-52sof our present-day global Air Force are the heirs of a sea-control tradition dating to the AAF's A-29s and B-24s of the Second World War.

From 1946 to 1991 the Strategic Air Command (SAC) operated the intercontinental and nuclear strike forces of the United States Air Force. During much of this period SAC was the premier operational command of the service. The rising tensions of the Cold War with Soviet-directed world communism gave the command a crucial role as the main force deterring potential aggression against the United States and itsallies. Even after the emergence of airborne strategic nuclear forces in the late 1950s, SAC's status as an Air Force major command and the Joint Chiefs of Staff specified command gave it the pivotal role in national strategy. This volume deals with the early years of the Air Force's effort to build and maintain a strategic striking force, from 1945 through 1953. Itdiscusses the period of reorganization in national defense in the years after the end of the Second World War, as the Army Air Forces dealt withquestions of structure, doctrine, strategy, atomic weapons, and technology. Crucial decisions were made at the end of 1947 and the beginning of 1948, but fiscal austerity limited the new United States Air Force in implementing those decisions. Despite this, General Curtis E. LeMay, the SACCommander, found means and developed methods to ensure a high state of combat readiness. The war in Korea triggered an expansion of the armed forces-including SAC-that culminated in the "New Look" of the Eisenhower administration. The New Look emphasized nuclear air power as the foundation of a national strategy of containment and deterrence. Walton S. Moody's analytical work discusses the challenges facing Air Force leaders in this time of stringent budgets, interservice disputes, andtechnological change. In particular, it examines the role of that leadership in fostering the development of an effective war-ready yet peace-keeping organization. The issues it raises are still relevant today, in a time when the distinction between strategic and tactical air power is less clear-cut, and when the armed services of the United States are redefining roles for themselves in the Post-Cold War era.

The United States Army Air Forces became an independent service, the United States Air Force, in 1947-the second year, supposedly, of "peace." In reality there had just begun a long conflict between the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and the satellite states subject to it. In 1949 the United States and most of the non-Communist countries of Europe signed theNorth Atlantic Treaty. The United States Air Force, which had been only a token presence on the continent since the end of World War II, once morecrossed the Atlantic in strength. The commitment of that service to peace and security in Europe, which continues still, has been the longest of its history. This pamphlet attempts to give the general reader some sense of the role theUSAF has played in Europe since the end of World War II. It contains three sections. The first reviews the reasons for the origins of the Cold War and describes the strategic concerns that drove the United States to commit itself tothe military defense of distant lands. The second section reviews the higher strategy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with specialreference to the central role of air power. The final section reviews the history of the United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) in order to show the many ways in which the United States Air Force has served American national security policy on the continent. This section is closely based on a brief history of USAFE prepared by Dr. Daniel Harrington of USAFE' s history office. I amgrateful to Dr. Harrington for having made his study available to me.

As the final days of Vietnam unfolded, the question was raised, "What happened to the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF)?" This book addresses that question in considerable detail. In order to sift out the story, three periods in the life of VNAF were selected-the Tet offensive of 1968, the Easter offensive of 1972, and lastly the March offensive of 1975. By examining each of these time periods, the factors at work in each period could be isolated so as to determine the performance of the VNAF. The role of the USAF was dominant in the 1968 and 1972 offensives. Although VNAF had grown in size to about 44 squadrons and 42,000 people by the time of the 1972 offensive, application of airpower at the major points of the enemy assault was U. S. Further, the bombing of the North Vietnam heartland during these two periods was the compelling leverage that resulted in the initiation and pursuit of active negotiations to stop the war. The intervening period between the peace agreement of January 27, 1973 and the North Vietnamese offensive of March 1975, was marked by fundamental changes in the character of the NVA forces and their deployment for battle. The NVA moved its center of logistics near the DMZ and into South Vietnam proper. The magnitude of SAM and AAA defenses constituted a major departure from those of the 1968 and 1972 campaigns. The VNAF, structured for a low scale war, was confronted with an enemy having the most sophisticated air defense weapons of the day.

In December 1918 Maj. Gen. Mason M. Patrick, Chief of Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), directed his newly appointed Assistant Chief of Staff, Col. Edgar S. Gorrell, toprepare a history and final report on U. S. air activities in Europe during World War I. The narratives written and compiled by Gorrell and his staff were submitted by Patrick to Gen. John J. Pershing, Commander in Chief of the AEF. They summarized Air Service activities from the arrival of the first airmen in France in the spring of 1917 until the Armistice on November 11, 1918. The"Final Report" was published by the Air Service in an Information Circular in 1921, and by the Army in a multivolume collection of World War I documents in 1948. Although it has been used andcited by a number of historians over the years, it deserves to be better known. The Office of Air Force History, therefore, is republishing it so as to reach a wider circle of persons interested in the Great War and the early history of military aviation. Another important document produced under Gorrell's supervision as part of the history of the Air Service, AEF, is a "Tactical History" written by Lt. Col. William C. Sherman and a group ofofficers working with him in France at the end of the war. Although published in part in an Air Service Information Circular in 1920, Sherman's "Tactical History" has remained virtually unknown, or at least has not had extensive use. Since it providesexcellent information about the conduct of combat operations, it should be of value to persons interested in aerial warfare in the First World War. It has been included, therefore, in this volumewith the "Final Report." This is one of a series of volumes of World War I documentation that the Office of Air Force History is planning to publish.

Air Leadership is part of a continuing series of historical volumes produced by the Office of Air Force History in direct support of Project Warrior. Since its beginnings in 1982, Project Warrior has captured the imagination of Air Force people around the world and reawakened a keener appreciation of our fundamental purpose as a Service: to deter war, but to be prepared to fight and win should deterrence fail. Military history helps provide a realistic perspective on warfare. Through the study of past events, we gain insight into the capabilities of armed forces and, most importantly, a sound knowledge of the policies, strategies, tactics, doctrine, leadership, and weapons that have produced success in battle. Each of us, in broadening our knowledge of air power's past, halps to maintain the most effective Air Force possible, now and in the future.

In April 1917, as the United States entered World War I, the Aviation Section of the U. S. Army Signal Corps had only a handful of usable flyingfields. This number quickly grew, ultimately exceeding 40 by the end of the war. Several uncompleted fields at the time of the Armistice were abandoned, and in the period between the world wars, the number of fields decreased more until only a relatively few were in use in 1939, when the country again began to rebuild its land and air forces. By the end of 1943, these few fields had grown to an astounding peak of 783-345 main bases, 116 subbases, and 322 auxiliary fields - a number not including the manydepots and ranges. Of the 89 bases described in this volume, only Langley and Kelly, which were both under construction in April 1917, remain fromthe pre-World War I era. Eight others were completed during that war, 11 were established between the wars, and 11 more have been opened since the end of World War II. The remaining 57 bases were built as part of thetremendous growth during the latter war. This volume deals, in a statistical format, with the histories of these bases, a topic of particular interest both inside and outside the Air Force. The book provides a ready reference for basic information on active USAF bases within the United States as of 1982, the 75th anniversary of military aviation in the United States and the date established as the cutoff for research in assembling this volume. The history contained in these bases is as old and as new as the history of aviation: the area where the Wright brothers conducted their early experiments is now included within Wright Patterson AFB, while tests of the latest experimental aircraft and space vehicles take place at Edwards AFB. Each base has its own special history and its own place in history. Air Force Bases should serve as a convenient resource for those interested in dates of activation, occupancy, closure, and transferral; in lists of units stationed at each installation; in the chief support organizations; and in the names of commanders. While numerous unit or organizational histories are available, much less has been written about the bases from whichthese units actually operated and trained. This volume fills that void.

This book explores the unique problem of defending air bases during the Vietnam War. It centers on the primary efforts of the United States Air Force and allied air units to defend 10 key air bases within the Republic of Vietnam. Bien Hoa, on 1 November 1964, was the first base to be attacked and until, the cease-lire in January 1973, these bases suffered a total of 475 attacks. 'Although there were initial deficiencies in staff support for base defense in such key areas as intelligence, motor vehicles, weapons procurement and maintenance, communications, and civil engineering, significant improvements hadbeen made by the end of the Air Force's part in the war. The author, Lt. Col. Roger P. Fox, USAF (Ret.), wrote this volume while assigned to the Office of Air Force History. He brings judgments to hisresearch based on his personal experience as a base security officer during the conflict. Thus, early on the morning of 4 December 1966, he rallied Air Force and South Vietnamese security forces to repel an enemy attempt to penetrateTan Son Nhut Air Base, the center of Air Force operations in South Vietnam. For his gallantry in action on this occasion, he was awarded the Silver Star. This personal experience formed a foundation upon which he developed a keen insight into exploring the entire spectrum of air base defense, and upon which he has built a strong case for testing future plans and operations. Colonel Fox's volume is one of a continuing series of books dealing with the war in Southeast Asia which are being written in the Office of Air ForceHistory.

This analytical work by Dr. Eduard Mark of the Center for Air Force History examines the practice of air interdiction in three wars: World War II, the Korean war, and the war in Southeast Asia. It considers eleven important interdiction campaigns, all of them American or Anglo-American, for only the United States and Great Britain had the resources to conduct interdiction campaigns on a large scale in World War II. Dr. Mark proposes what he considers to be a realistic objective for interdiction: preventing men, equipment, and supplies from reaching the combat area when the enemy needs them and in the quantity he requires. As Mark notes, there has been little intensive scholarship on the subject of interdiction especially when contrasted with the work done on strategic bombardment. In the wake of the Persian Gulf war, the reader will no doubt be impressed by the comparatively low performance of weapons in these pre-Gulf war campaigns. DESERT STORM showed that recent advances in technology had enabled interdiction to reach new levels of effectiveness, especially in night operations. Yet, as the reader soon discovers, interdiction in the pre-Gulf campaigns sometimes profoundly influenced militaryoperations. As is often the case in military history, the effects were often serendipitous-not as planned or anticipated, but present nevertheless. By the middle of the Second World War, aircraft were already demonstrating that they could have a devastating impact upon a military force'sability to wage war. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, for example, complained bitterly during the North African and Normandy campaigns about air power that, in his memorable words, "pinned my army to the ground" and otherwise denied his forces both supplies and the ability to freely maneuver.

In its first fifty years as an independent armed service, the United States Air Force (USAF) has fostered science and technology and-in partnership with the private sector-developedand produced the complex tools of aerospace power that helped the Free World prevail in the Cold War. The foundation for these extraordinary achievements was laid in the forty yearsbefore the Air Force separated from the U. S. Army in 1947. This booklet tells the story of how the air components of the Army and then the USAF organized and managed the activities required to get aircraft and other weapon systems from thedrawing board to the flightline or the launch pad. Published as one of a series of booklets celebrating the 50th anniversary of the USAF in 1997, this study is the first overall historical synopsis of the service's acquisition structure. Thetext was originally prepared as a chapter in the Air Force Acquisition Factbook, a compendium of acquisition programs and policies published by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition). Hence the study is intended both toeducate personnel in today's acquisition community about their antecedents and to commemorate this aspect of the Air Force'sheritage to a wider audience.

Many documents, articles, and stories have been written about U. S. Air Force operations in Southeast Asia (SEA). However, given the critical in-depth coverage commensurate with our level of involvement. This volume, the first in a USAF Southeast Asia Monograph series, is an attempt to document the story of AIR-POWER -- and the people behind it -- in our nation's longest armed conflict. For eight years American airman fought with a multitude of missions, evolving weaponry, ever changing tactics and maybe most notable --constantly changing constraints. In this volume, authors from the Air War College and Air Command and Staff College who actually fought there have combined for two excellent monographs of the people and weapons in SEA. The authors' breadth of combat experience provides a penetrating account of airpower brought to bear --with all the emotion, frustrations, bravery and confusion of real life. For the general reader, these stories tell of airpower in human terms and should give some understanding of the spirit, courage, and professionalism of our U. S. airmen. To the student of airpower interested in improving the effectiveness of our Air Force, the monographs make an excellent case study of tactical air doctrine. The entire series is dedicated to ALL who served.

The Condensed Analysis contains a short history of the Ninth Air Force in World War II, from the build-up before the invasion of the European continent through subsequent combat operations in 1944 and 1945. More than a narrative history, the study examines the problems that Ninth experienced in conducting joint combat operationswith ground forces across the rapidly moving battlefront in France and Germany. Some of its recommendations were implemented after World War II, others involve issues we continue to struggle with today: The need for a theater level air headquarters, command and control of tactical air forces, the importance of air-ground cooperation (including the co-location of headquarters), and the absence of the capability to mount night and all-weather operations-the lackof a "real and effective 24-hour-a-day operation." In its comprehensiveness, the Condensed Analysis also touches aircrew training and rotation, air base defense organization, civil engineering support, intelligence- virtually every one of today's Air Force specialities. Since 1945 the Air Force has gone far in creating a modernizedforce structure with highly professional personnel. Yet many of the doctrinal problems identified during World War II are still with us today. A look back, therefore, can be a useful reminder of howsuch problems developed and how they might be solved.

In commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean War, the official history offices of the U. S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force and their respective historical associations collaborated to sponsor as comprehensive a symposium as possible, including as participants some of the coalition partners who contributed forces and weapons to the war. The intent of this symposium, titled Coalition Air Warfare during the Korean War, 1950 -1953, was to focus not only on the contributions made by thearmed forces of the United States, but also on those of America's allies. The diverse group of panelists and speakers included not only scholars with subject matter expertise, but also veteran soldiers, sailors, and airmen who had served inthat conflict. It was hoped that the melding of these diverse perspectives would provide interesting, if sometimes conflicting, views about the Korean War. The symposium organizers designated an agenda of six specific panels for investigation, including Planning and Operations; Air Superiority, Air Support of Ground Forces; Air Interdiction and Bombardment, Air Reconnaissance and Intelligence, and Logistical Support of Air Operations. Each session began with commentary by the panel chairman, which was followed by formal papers, and in some instances included a lively question and answer session. The papers and most of the proceedings found their way into print and are recorded here in an effort to permanently capture the activities, challenges, contributions, and heroics of the coalition air forces and the airmen who fought during the Korean conflict.

This volume is the second in a series on active Air Force bases and a continuation of a recent line of works prepared for the Center for Air Force History under the Reference Series. These reference books contain specific information about a number of topics of interest to the UnitedStates Air Force and other arms of the Department of Defense. They are designed to present fundamental data about such diverse subjects as Air Force aircraft, combat action, unit lineage and honors, campaign medals and streamers, and air bases, for those who will write more extensive narrative accounts about Air Force activities and operations. Volume II in the Air Force Bases series provides important background information about overseas installations that are less well known than domestic stations. The active installations included in this volume, to be sure, represent only a fraction of the overseas bases, fields, and stations operated by theUnited States Air Force and its predecessor organizations since the beginning of World War II. Nevertheless, many of the most significant andenduring air bases appear in these pages, some of which are essential to America's defense posture. This work represents a starting point for military students and staff officers involved in defense research or planning, and for scholars interested in serious research of air bases and the Air Force organizations that operated from them.

For the past eighty years the US military establishment has worked to integrate air power into its doctrine, strategy, force structure, and tactics in order to maximize the nation's security. This study by Dr. Richard Davis highlights one aspect of this process, that of providing the most potent mix of army and air forces to prosecute ground warfare. It also illustrates the impedimentsto joint action created by the services' separateorganizations and distinctive doctrine. In addition, this monograph suggests that changes to improve interservice cooperation are often either forced by combat or imposed from the top down by the highest levels of the service or defense hierarchies. In World War II, Korea, and Vietnamthe services developed weapons and systems that brought air power to bear on the battlefield in a relatively quick and overwhelmingly powerful manner. Without the impetus of war, however, the services seem often to fall back on their broader agenda of preparation for future war. In the case of the 1980s, intervention by the Chiefs of the Air Force and Army Staffs forced increased cooperation for battlefield synchronization and integration. In this instance the two Chiefs recognized the needand acted. Generals Gabriel and Wickham, aided by their deputies for plans and operations, Lieutenant Generals John T. Chain, Jr., and Fred K. Mahaffey, set up a small ad hoc group, bypassing their own services' formal staffstructure, to fabricate a new method of mutual force development, including cross-service budgeting and programming procedures. The Chiefs adopted the group's recommendations as the foundation of a continuing joint force development process.