U. S. Air Force

This is the third in a series of research studies-historical works that were not published for various reasons. Yet, the material contained therein was deemed to be of enduring value to Air Force members and scholars. These were minimally edited and printed in a limited edition to reach a small audience that may find them useful. We invite readers to provide feedback to the Air Force History and Museums Program. The author, Marcelle S. Knaack, a member of the Office of Air Force History, undertook the research and writing of this book as a consultant, after she retired. Tragically, she passed away in November 1996, before she completed the manuscript. Her colleague, Bernard C. Nalty, also retired by that time, undertook to complete Ms. Knaack's work. At first glance, the history of the C-5A Galaxy seems to be nothing more than a compilation of contradictions. Ordered under a totally new procurement concept specifically designed to control costs, the C-5A aircraft ended up costing a small fortune. Its purchase in 1965 depended on achieving an initial operational capability no later than 1969, but the transport did not appear in South Vietnam in a truly operational capacity until August 1971. Although built by the Lockheed-Georgia Company, celebrated for its success with military transports like the C-130 Hercules and C-141 Starlifter, the C-5A program from the verystart encountered serious technical problems, delays, and exorbitant cost overruns, which combined to trigger several congressional investigations. Although the program contracted in size under the pressure of these failings, it survived congressional opposition and began to demonstrate its unique value during the last year of the Vietnam War, even though operating under weight restrictions. In October 1973, moreover, the C-5A helped provide Israel with a constant flow of supplies to ensure victory over the attacking Egyptian and Syrian armies. Into the 1980s the C-5A operated under increasingly stringent flying restrictions because the flawed wing structure deteriorated until it had to be replaced. While under these restrictions, the C-5A could carry just 174,000 pounds of cargo, roughly 100,000 pounds more than the C-141, but 46,000 pounds less than the Galaxy's design objective. Although installation of the heavier new wing would probably prevent the airplane from ever attaining the design capacity of 220,000 pounds, the Military Airlift Command was determined to extend the service life of the C-5A because its performance remained so impressive even with a reduced load. The improvements that strengthened the structure of the C-5A were incorporated in a new version of the Galaxy, the C-5B, for which Lockheed-Georgia reopened its production line. The modified A-model and the new C-5B did everything expected of a heavy-logistics transport during the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991.

This study surveys the changes in the size and functions of Headquarters United States Air Force (USAF) since its inception in September 1947. It examines both the external and internal factors that influenced the Headquarters USAF organization. Additionally, it surveys and evaluates the many reorganizations that were implemented over time. Divided into three sections. this study begins with a consideration of the external influences that have shaped the Headquarters USAF organization. The second section addresses Air Force internal changes. The third section considers the statistical jumble that invariably accompanies any work dealing with administrative reorganization and also compares Air Force Headquarters strength with that of other Services. Several appendices are included to illustrate the intricacies of reorganization and to suggest some of the difficulties associated with tracking change in a bureaucracy. Finally, a select bibliography is included for those who may wish to delve into this topic in greater detail.

Early on the morning of January 17, 1991, the Persian Gulf War began. It consisted of massive allied air strikes on Iraq and Iraqi targets in Kuwait. The United States Air Force spearheaded the air offensive and furnished the bulk of the attacking aircraft. During forty-two days of fighting, the U. S. Air Force simultaneously conducted two closely coordinated air campaigns: one in support of allied ground forces; the other, attacking strategic targets. Planners of the strategic air campaign sought to isolate and incapacitate Saddam Hussein's government; gain and maintain air supremacy to permit unhindered air operations; destroy Iraq's nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities; and eliminate Iraq'soffensive military capability, which included its key military production facilities, their infrastructure, and the instruments it used to project its power-the Iraqi Air Force, the Republican Guard, and short-range ballistic missiles. This study develops background information to place the Persian Gulf War in its proper historical and cultural contexts, unfamiliar to and not easily understood by Americans. The first essay quickly summarizes the relationship between Arab culture and Islam, the history of Islam and the Arab conquests, and the creation of one of the flash points in present-day Middle Eastern conflicts-the Arab-Jewish dispute over Palestine. The second essay provides a military analysis of the Arab-Israeli wars from 1948 to 1982. It describes the performance of the engaged armed forces, the performance of Western versus Soviet weaponssystems, the development of the respective forces' military professionalization, and the ability of the warring parties to learn from their experiences. The final three essays describe the recent history of the three regional powers of the Persian Gulf-Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq. In addition to providing a detailed character analysis of Saddam Hussein and a military analysis of the Iran-Iraq War, these final sections examine the tension that arose in the three nations when the desire for modernization confronted the demands of Islamic conservatism

This study analyzes one of the most difficult problems that continues to face the U. S. Government: how to balance the costs of national security against the overall needs of the nation andhow to divide up the defense costs among the military services so as to secure the most effective forces and weapons. Strategy and Money traces some of the causes of interservice controversy to the complicated factors of budget-making and shows the effects of the budget on military policy. Using the defense budget for fiscal year 1961 as an example, the author describes the budget process during 1959-60, through the presentations by the services and reviews by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. The concluding section points out that the disagreements within the JCS over force programs and weapon systems reveal the degree to which money decisions have influenced strategic concepts and plans. Strategy and Money forms a part of the larger History of Headquarters USAF. It is being published separately to make it more readilyavailable throughout the Air Force.

Air Operations in the Taiwan Crisis of 1958 is one of a series of studies on air operations in international incidents, prepared by the USAF Historical Division Liaison Office at the request of the Directorate of Plans, Headquarters USAF. Thishistorical narrative, by Jacob Van Staaveren, is based on primary source materials available in 1960--messages and correspondence--and on histories from many levels of the Air Force, including units, commands, and the Air Staff. Originally prepared in a very few copies, the study has been in great demand by the Air Staff, major commands, and Department of Defense agencies and is now being published for wider dissemination. The defense of Taiwan has been and will continue to be a source of major concern to the United States and especially to the U. S. armed services. It is likely that there may be more military crises involving Taiwan and its related islands. The crisis in 1958 provided a test of American military planning concepts that should prove of value for future planning. Occurring in the Pacific almost simultaneously with the Lebanon crisis of July-August 1958, it created certain planning, operational, and logistic problems that had not been anticipated.

The Threshold of Space is a brief study of the national space program from 1954 through 1959 with emphasis on the role of the Air Force. It was originally prepared as a chapter for inclusion in theHistory of Headquarters USAF, Fiscal Year 1959. Because of the importance and timeliness of the subject, the chapter is being issued as a separate study to make it more quickly available throughout the Air Force. Based chiefly on official documents, The Threshold of Space is a precis of a much more detailed history on the space program currently being prepared. Rather than confining itself to fiscal year 1959, the present study reaches back to the beginnings of space research in the l940's and carries the story forward to January 1960. This was necessary to provide the proper perspective for an understanding and appreciation of this vital area of national activity. It was impossible in a study of this length to cover all facets of the space program, whether national or Air Force. There had to be a choice of topics such as policy, the selection of projects for development, and the widespread distribution by the Department of Defense of systems and subsystems among the three services for researchand tests. Other topics almost equally important had to be excluded. Among the latter there were such subjects as interservice rivalry for control of the satellite-detection fence and the Navy-Air Force dispute about the Pacific Missile Range. It was also necessary to omit coverage of the valuable work done by the Air Force in the field of space medicine and in the establishment of international agreements for the construction of bases outside the United States. These and other subjects will receive thorough treatment in the more comprehensive history now under way.

In commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean War, the U. S. Air Force (USAF) Historian commissioned the Research Division, Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, to compile this chronology of significant events of USAF military operations in the Korean theater. The chronology points out the relationship of these operations to the land battle, naval operations, and important political and diplomatic events. It also identifies such USAF historical "firsts" as the first all-jet air battle, the introduction of new weapons systems, and the initiation of tactics, techniques, or procedures that had a major impact on later air operations. The chronology also identifies important people, including key commanders, recipients of the Medal of Honor, and aces. Finally, it attempts to summarize those USAF events in Korea that best illustrate the air war and the application of air power in the theater. To present the information most effectively, the chronology offers narrative monthly summaries followed by daily entries of significant events. Each daily entry uses the local date, which in the theater is one day later than the date in the United States. Two dates separated by a hyphen indicate that the entry covers events occurring from the first date through the second. Two dates separated by a slash indicate that the events occurred during nighttime hours. Each event includes an explanation of its significance or correlates to information in the monthly summary. The entries are based on primary sources available at the AFHRA, including organizational histories, intelligence summaries, digests, and operational statements of the U. S. Far East Command, Far East Air Forces (FEAF), Fifth Air Force, FEAF Bomber Command, FEAF Combat Cargo Command (Provisional), and the 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo). Sometimes, wing and group histories provided additional information. The researchers also consulted numerous secondary sources, usually to confirm the most significant events of the air war in Korea.

Throughout the War in Southeast Asia, Communist forces from North Vietnam infiltrated the isolated, neutral state of Laos. Men and supplies crossed the mountain passes and traveled along an intricate web of roads and jungle paths known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail to the Viet Cong insurgents in South Vietnam. American involvement in Laos began with photo-reconnaissance missions and, as the war in Vietnam intensified, expanded to a series of air-ground operations from bases in Vietnam and Thailand against fixed targets and infiltration routes in southern Laos. U. S. Air Force leaders and aircrews flying interdiction missions over Laotian territory faced a unique set of challenges. Their efforts were plagued by political controversies, daunting weather, rugged terrain, a tenacious foe, and above all a bewildering array of rules of engagement limiting the effectiveness of air operations. Interdiction in Southern Laos, 1960-1968 examines this complex operational environment. Many of these issues-particularly those relevant to conducting a politically sensitive, limited war from foreign bases, with a commitment to minimizing civilian casualties-are still relevant today and for the foreseeable future as the modern Air Force meets its responsibilities in an ever-changing global environment.

Air-Ground Teamwork on the Western Front describes close air support and battlefield interdiction in action. A single, month-long campaign-the famous thrust across northern France in August 1944 of Gen. George S. Patton's Third Army and Maj. Gen. 0. P. Weyland's XIX Tactical Air Command-became a model for close cooperation between army and aviation forces in future conflicts. This day-by-day, blow-by-blowaccount shows how the ground forces raced forward, frequently twenty miles per day, because friendly air power protected their flanks, shielded them from the Luftwaffe, and devastated the opposition in front of them.

The AAF in Northwest Africa focuses on the Allied assault on Northwest Africa and the battle for Tunisia-the critical second front that secured the Mediterranean and increased the enemy's vulnerability to a massive invasion from Britain. From this experience of the Twelfth Air Force and its British counterparts in 1942-43 evolved a spirit of Anglo-American cooperation and important aspects of air doctrine still relevant to today's Air Force.

In our continuing desire to bring to the reader an in-depth look at the use of airpower in Southeast Asia, we present in this volume a truly monumental effort at recounting the myriad of widely separate but not unrelated events and operations that took place during the spring invasion of 1972. In this monograph, the authors from the Air War College present an illuminating story of the people and machines that fought so gallantly during this major enemy offensive. The authors' breadth of experience in and out of combat enables them toprovide a penetrating account of how airpower was brought to bear upon the enemy. The "Vietnamization" program, begun in 1969, had by March of 1972 reduced U. S. manpower involvement in Vietnam from 500,000 to 95,000. U. S. airpower involvement, however, did not decrease proportionately. Although the South Vietnamese Air Force took up the "lion's share" of the effort, U. S. airmen were still very much involved. During the offensive, their skills, courageand professionalism were tested 24 hours a day, directly contributing to the eventual successful outcome. The reader should learn from this story that not only is airpower an essential element of any major operation, but that its employment is a team effort. More so, it involves men and women on the ground as well as in the air -- one cannot function without the other.

One of the major lessons of World War II was theneed for the military services, both in the UnitedStates and elsewhere, to work together in mutuallysupporting ways to defeat an enemy. Changingtechnology and the worldwide character of the waraltered the traditional boundaries between land and sea warfare, and the new elements of air power and atomic weapons even further called into question the traditional roles and missions of the armed services. In 1947, the U. S. Air Force became independent ofthe Army and a National Military Establishment (which became the Department of Defense in 1949) was formed to coordinate and, after 1949, to control the services. Yet, disagreements over roles and missions continued, often exacerbated by the fiscal limitations of the post-war era. But not all roles and missions disagreements were caused by financial struggles. Genuine differences of opinion over doctrinal issues and the best means to accomplish missions often divided the services, and on many occasions the Secretary ofDefense had to assign missions and adjudicate roles amid a blizzard of conflicting claims. Dr. Richard Wolf of the Office of Air Force Historyhas collected in this volume the most significantdocuments which have determined the roles and missions of the Air Force, from its birth in 1947 to the present. The documents themselves only tell part of the story, of course. Dr. Wolf provides anintroductory essay to each document so that readers can comprehend the context in which the decisions over roles and missions took place. The result is a convenient and useful reference tool for anyone working with, or studying, the organizational and doctrinal basis of the United States Air Force.

The History of the United States Air Force is more than a tribute to the men and women responsible for the advancement of military aviation. Individualheroes do emerge, air battles are recounted, and record-setting flights described, but the book also deals with the ideas and decisions that have made the U. S. Air Force the professional military organization it is. Activity in the lecture hall and on the flight line, in the corridors of government and in aeronautical research facilities, and in both peacetime and during wars have helped shape the institution, influence its conduct, and fix its goals. The Air Force continues to serve the country effectively and efficiently because its men and women understand that experience provides the foundation for progress. More than any other military organization, the U. S. Air Force searches out and listens to the experience history offers. Few problems arise from a void or occur without precedent; and while every challenge possesses itsunique aspects, the perspective of time and the careful consideration of what already has succeeded or failed inevitably improves the effectiveness of today's decisions and the quality of planning for the future. History is therefore important to the Air Force; the recorded past is afoundation for doctrine, policy, strategy, tactics, equipment development, organization, force structure, and virtually every other element of air power. This volume, published in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Air Force as an independent service, is especially valuable. Not only should it both inspire and enlighten the members of the Air Force, it should also serve as a convenient source of information for those outside the service who are interested in the origin, growth, evolution and application of American air power.

The History of the United States Air Force is more than a tribute to the men and women responsible for the advancement of military aviation. Individualheroes do emerge, air battles are recounted, and record-setting flights described, but the book also deals with the ideas and decisions that have made the U. S. Air Force the professional military organization it is. Activity in the lecture hall and on the flight line, in the corridors of government and in aeronautical research facilities, and in both peacetime and during wars have helped shape the institution, influence its conduct, and fix its goals. The Air Force continues to serve the country effectively and efficiently because its men and women understand that experience provides the foundation for progress. More than any other military organization, the U. S. Air Force searches out and listens to the experience history offers. Few problems arise from a void or occur without precedent; and while every challenge possesses itsunique aspects, the perspective of time and the careful consideration of what already has succeeded or failed inevitably improves the effectiveness of today's decisions and the quality of planning for the future. History is therefore important to the Air Force; the recorded past is a foundation for doctrine, policy, strategy, tactics, equipment development, organization, force structure, and virtually every other element of air power. This volume, published in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Air Force as an independent service, is especially valuable. Not only should it both inspire and enlighten the members of the Air Force, it should also serve as a convenient source of information for those outside the service who are interested in the origin, growth, evolution and application of American air power.

Under normal circumstances, the command and control of the nation's strategic air forces is a tremendous task. At the start of the 1960's, for example, an average of 122 bomber and tankeraircraft of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) were airborne each day, with inflight refueling taking place at the rate of once every 6.8 minutes. Large-scale exercises by the command often involved more than 500 aircraft. The enormous size of SAC, with 260,000 men and thousands of aircraft scattered around the globe and with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) beginning to enter the force, greatly compounded the problems of command and control. To supervise and direct this widely dispersed force, the Air Force and SAC over the years built a worldwide communication network for the rapid transmission of information and action directives. The network in 1960 included: {a) a primary alert system of voice communications between SAC's underground control center at Offutt, AFB and all base control rooms in the United States and overseas; (b) a single sideband high frequency point-to-point radio system; {c) a telephone system for day-to-day operational control purposes; and {d) a teletype system to convey printed operational information. These several systems generated huge amounts of data on the daily status of the force which were continuously processed and displayed in the SAC control center. As early as 1954, however, the flood of information bad become so great the SAC commander {CINCSAC) expressed concern over the center's inability to stay current with the disposition of the force. The primary difficulty involved the center's machinery for data reduction, correlation, and display. Based on manual World War II devices and techniques, the processing fell further and further behind the improved operational capabilities of the airborneelements.

This study was prepared in response to an Air Staffrequest for a history of command and control procedures used in close air support (CAS). The writer, Mr. Riley Sunderland, is co-author of the official Army history of the China-Burma-IndiaTheater, World War II, and wrote 5 RAND Corp. studies of the Communist insurgency in Malaya. He begins with brief comment on the invention of close air support during World War I, then moves on to the evolution of the modern Tactical Air Control System (TACS) from the late 1930's to thepresent. Only major developments are treated to keep the subject manageable. The author, distinguishing between doctrine and procedure, has focused on the former. For official definitions of "doctrine" and "close air support," the reader is referred to Air Force Manual (AFM) 11-1, USAF Glossary of Standardized Terms. Close air support is the third of 3 principal missions of tactical air forces, of which air superiority is first and interdiction second. The classic statement is in War Department Field Manual (FM) 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, 21 July 1943, paragraph 16. Close air support may also be provided by strategic air, e.g., St. Lo, France, 1944; Khe Sanh, South Vietnam, 1968. The responsible air commander must weigh the allocation of resources betweenthe 3 basic tactical air missions, lest an injudicious commitment of his forces to any one mission degrades his ability to perform the others. As will be seen in Mr. Sunderland's narrative, this has been a major issue in the handling of tactical air.