U. S. Air Force

Command and Control for North American Air Defense, 1959-1963, is the third in a series of studies prepared by the USAF Historical Division Liaison Office (AFCHO) on command and control. This study discusses the issues and problems involved in centralizing authority and control over forces responsible for maintaining airspace vigilance in peacetime and combating any aircraft attack, as distinct from space (missile) attacks. Preliminary sections summarize the steps taken to remove the doctrinal and structural barriers which long served to dissipate the ability of air defense commanders to control their forces and trace conversion of the system from manual to semi-automatic operation. The main body of the study is concerned with the impact that the threat of missile attack had on aircraft defense command and control systems. A final section charts the likely course of future command and control developments as they appeared at the close of 1963. This study forms a part of the larger History of Headquarters USAF, Fiscal Year 1963. It is being published separately to make it more readily available throughout the Air Force.

Concurrently with the buildup of its general purpose forces to deter or win limited conflicts instigated by Communist nations, the Air Force strengthened its airlift forces appreciably. This was a logically necessary step, since Army as well as USAF combat units would depend on efficient airlift to deploy quickly to widely scattered locations where aggression against U. S. allies appeared likely to occur. Strengthening USAF Airlift Forces, 1961-1964 is an account of the airlift buildup and should be read in conjunction with the author's previous study, Strengthening USAF General Purpose Forces, 1961-1964 in a sense a companion monograph. The writer has emphasized generally the viewpoint of planners in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force and Headquarters USAF. At the same time, he has discussed the relationship of their planning to the broader national military policy enunciated by the President and the Secretary of Defense. Dependence of the Army on airlift for the movement of its combat units also necessitated close cooperation between Air Force and Army, and this sometimes led to sharp differences of opinion and heated controversy. Prepared as part of the continuing History of Headquarters USAF, this study is being issued separately to make it available quickly in convenient form.

Professor Stephen B. Johnson demonstrates in fine detail how the application of systems management by the United States Air Force to its ballistic missiles and computer programs not only produced critical new weapons, but also benefitedAmerican industry. Systems management harmonized the disparate goals of four interest groups. For the military it brought rapid technological progress; for scientists, new products; for engineers, dependability; and for managers, predictable cost. The process evolved, beginning shortly after the end of World War II, when Gen. Henry H. "Hap" Arnold directed that the Army Air Forces (later the U. S. Air Force) continue its wartime collaboration with the scientific community. This started as a voluntary association, with the establishment of the Scientific Advisory Board and Project RAND. In the early 1950s, the Air Force reorganized its researchand development (R&D) function with the creation of Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) and the Air Staff's office of deputy chief of staff for development (DCS/D), which were both aimed at controlling the scientists. The systems management approach evolved out of a jurisdictional conflict between ARDC and its rival, Air Materiel Command (AMC). The latter controlled R&D finances and was determined not to relinquish its prerogatives. Of course, ARDC argued that this was a case of having responsibility without the requisite authority. At first represented by Gen. Bernard A. Schriever's ballistic missiles program, ARDC bypassed traditional organizational structures. Schriever's Western Development Division (WDD), located at Inglewood, California, made its case, based upon the Soviet Union's nuclear threat, to engage in the race to develop longrange ballistic missiles. Ultimately, Schriever's new project management and weapons systems procedures-concurrency-produced a family of missile and space vehicles. However, in bypassing administrative red tape, this development also eliminated some necessarychecks and balances that led to a series of flight test failures and cost overruns. Closely related to the missiles program was the air defense effort, centered at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in Boston. Dr. Jay Forrester's Project Whirlwind evolved into large-scale, real-time computers. Again, as with themissiles program, once the Cold War waned, the government's emphasis shifted to cost control. When Schriever assumed command of ARDC, he transplanted his successful Inglewood model to all major weapons systems acquisition. Ironically, in the early 1960s, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara appropriated Schriever's procedures, using them to wield ever greater centralized control. Dr. Johnson shows that Air Force procedures were not only highly successful in terms of meeting the challenges of the Cold War, but also that their adoption by American industry propelled the nation to international prominence in aerospaceand computing. Finally, he argues that while aerospace had experienced somewhat more difficulty adapting to consumer products than did the computer industry, the full implications of systems management were yet to be seen by the end of the Cold War.

The Southeast Asia Monograph Series is designed and dedicated to telling the story of USAF's participation in the Vietnam War. This monograph, the sixth in the Series, adds another exciting chapter to our continuing effort to bring forth and highlight the dedication, courage, and professionalism of the U. S. airman in combat. Theprimary intent of this series is. to emphasize and dramatize the human aspects of this long and frustrating struggle, straying somewhat away from the cold hard statistics of "tons of bombs dropped" and "structures destroyed," etc., frequently the headliners in historical presentations." Last Flight From Saigon" is an exciting and moving account of how all our Services, as well as several civilian agencies, pulled together to pull-off the largest aerial evacuation in history-what many have referred to as a modern day Dunkirk. The three authors, intimately involved with the evacuation from beginning to end, have carefully pieced together an amazing story of courage, determination and American ingenuity. Above all, it's a story about saving lives;one that is seldom told in times of war. All too often, critics of armed conflict make their targets out to be something less than human, bent on death and destruction. One need only study theenormity of the effort and cost that went into the "evacuation of Saigon," and the resultant thousands of lives that were saved, to realize that the American fighting man is just as capable, and more eager, to save lives than he is in having to wage war. The reader can help tell this story by sharing this book with his friends.

The Southeast Asia Monograph Series is designed and dedicated to telling the story of USAF's participation in the Vietnam War. This monograph, the sixth in the Series, adds another exciting chapter to our continuing effort to bring forth and highlight the dedication, courage, and professionalism of the U. S. airman in combat. Theprimary intent of this series is. to emphasize and dramatize the human aspects of this long and frustrating struggle, straying somewhat away from the cold hard statistics of "tons of bombs dropped" and "structures destroyed," etc., frequently the headliners in historical presentations." Last Flight From Saigon" is an exciting and moving account of how all our Services, as well as several civilian agencies, pulled together to pull-off the largest aerial evacuation in history-what many have referred to as a modern day Dunkirk. The three authors, intimately involved with the evacuation from beginning to end, have carefully pieced together an amazing story of courage, determination and American ingenuity. Above all, it's a story about saving lives;one that is seldom told in times of war. All too often, critics of armed conflict make their targets out to be something less than human, bent on death and destruction. One need only study theenormity of the effort and cost that went into the "evacuation of Saigon," and the resultant thousands of lives that were saved, to realize that the American fighting man is just as capable, and more eager, to save lives than he is in having to wage war. The reader can help tell this story by sharing this book with his friends.

The Air Force's humanitarian operations received wide attention during the 1990s, as they will for years to come. They are part of a well-establishedtradition dating back three-quarters of a century to the early days of military flight. The nation's first airmen recognized early on aviation's potential for alleviating the effects of natural disasters. As early as September 1919, Army Air Service planes from Kelly Field, Texas, dropped food supplies to marooned flood victims along the Rio Grande. On a few occasions duringthe 1920s, American aviators bombed their own country-for good cause. They delivered ordnance against ice jams in the Delaware, Platte, and Susquehanna rivers to prevent flooding, save bridges, and restore navigation. In March 1929 at least twenty-one airplanes from Maxwell Field, Alabama, delivered twenty-seven tons of food and other supplies to flood victims in the southern part of the state. The Army flew several dramatic relief missions during the 1930s. In 1932 bombers dropped supplies to Navajo Indians who had become snowbound by severe blizzards in Arizona. In December 1935 the 5th Bombardment Group bombed the Mauna Loa volcano, diverting its lavaflow away from Hilo, Hawaii. In 1936 Air Corps squadrons flew food and other supplies to flood victims in Pennsylvania and the following year tosouthern Illinois. During February 1939 the Army air-delivered medical aid in the wake of an earthquake in Chile. World War II proved the most costly conflict in history. It has been estimated that during the six years of warfare, about 85 million people were killed and another 60 million rendered homeless. Around the globe, staggering numbers of unfortunates needed food and medical relief.

Historians have written extensively about the United States Air Force as an instrument of war, focusing on aerial combat, bombing, strafing, and the transportation of troops and weapons. They have written less about the role of the USAF in supporting disaster relief operations, in helping emerging nations meet the needs of their citizens, and in feeding the hungry anywhere in the world-missions which are cumulatively known as humanitarian airlift. One might even think this is a new role for the U. S. military. This book attempts to fill a historical gap by addressing humanitarian airlift missions as an important part of Air Force heritage. Rarely acting alone in conducting humanitarian relief efforts, the U. S. Air Force has served with the U. S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. It has worked with other federal agencies such as the Federal Emergency ManagementAgency, the State Department, and the Agency for International Development. It has also interacted with private charitable organizations. Air Force humanitarian airlift operations include providing assistance at home and abroad. In the event of a domestic disaster, the federal government follows a procedure first defined by the Federal Disaster Act of 1950. After an emergency, a governor requests federal assistance and the president declares the region a federal disaster area. In recent decades, the Federal Emergency Management Agency has coordinated domestic disaster relief, often requesting the support of the Department of Defense for airlift missions. In the case of an international disaster, a foreign government requests relief through the U. S. embassy, permitting the State Department's Agency for International Development and its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance to coordinatethe relief effort. Both organizations have used the USAF for airlift when commercial aircraft were not available or could not perform the mission. In recent years, the Department of Defense established its own office of humanitarian assistance to coordinate congressionally- mandated transport of privately donated relief supplies and distribution of excess nonlethal Defense Department cargo. The Military Airlift Command dominated, but did not monopolize, humanitarian airlifts during the Cold War. Other Air Force commands, such as U. S. Air Forces in Europe, Pacific Air Forces, Tactical Air Command, Alaskan Air Command, Caribbean Air Command, Southern Air Command, and Air Mobility Command took part in significant relief flights. Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard crews and aircraft also participated in many operations, either independently or by complementing active organizations.

One of the highest compliments a USAF research and engineering officer can receive on his work is that it met the standards of "the Arnold-von Karman tradition." This allusion epitomizes objectivity of inquiry and thoroughness and excellence of performance. This documented narrative traces that proud tradition from its genesis through the twentieth anniversary of its creator and most zealous guardian-the Scientific Advisory Board to the Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Air Force. Hopefully, the work will serve as both testimonial and concise source book on the invaluable contribution which this dedicated and uniquely skilled companion-in-arms has made to the cause of American aerospace supremacy.

The primary focus of this work in on those privately printed unit and organizational histories produced outside the official channels of the armed services. Some official reports are included because they fall within the criteria set out below. This guide is intended to assist the user in understanding the scheme for listing the titles and the organization of entries. The unit history has been popular since the Civil War. It most often is an un-official publication written and produced by the personnel who constituted the unit. It is often an expression of pride of their accomplishments typically published just after the termination of hostilities. It can provide a wealth of detail concerning the unit's formation, combat experiences, missions etc. It often provides photographs taken by the unit members and often includes individual and/or group portraits of the personnel assigned to it. Since it was most often an un-official publication, its attention to detail and accuracy can be wanting. They were often published to bolster the moral and tended to concentrate on the positive and often ignore the negative. One of their major benefit is they often portrayed the day to day activities, hardships, and the feelings and thoughts of its members much better than many if not most of the official histories. Some of the more recent publications sponsored by the unit associations often combine the official records including after action reports and unit journal with extensive research producing extremely detailed histories. One major problem relation to the privately printed publications is that due to their nature they had extreme limited printing and distribution was most often limited to those unit member in the unit at the time of printing. They become extremely rare and can be almost impossible purchase. Criteria for Including Titles: * The following categories of printed are included in this listing: * Privately sponsored or Aun-official@ histories often written by the unit historian and published orprinted by the unit association. The distribution of these was most often limited to members of association.* Personal narratives that are unit or organization specific or identifiable in content. These were oftenautobiographical accounts by unit members and often provide a better insight to the morale and actions than the official or general histories. * Career biographies and autobiographies of officers, particularly general officers, who served in numerous units, are generally not included in this compilation.* Purely photographic or pictorial histories relating to a specific unit or command providing photographs of the activities, missions, aircraft and/or equipment, airfields, etc.* Route of battle maps. Although these are more commonly found with army ground units, there arealso maps that provide historical information and a description of the geographical area covered by the unit or missions flown.* Printed or published personnel rosters listing past and/or present members of uni

During the war in Southeast Asia, U. S. Air Forcefighter pilots and crewmen were repeatedly challenged by enemy MIG's in the skies over NorthVietnam. The air battles which ensued were uniquein American history because U. S. fighter and strikeforces operated under stringent rules of engagement. With periodic exceptions, for example, MIG bases could not be struck. The rules generally forbade bombing or strafing of military and industrial targets in and around the enemy's heartland, encompassing the capital of Hanoi and the port city of Haiphong. These restrictions gave the North Vietnamese substantial military advantage. Free from American attack and helped by its Soviet and Chinese allies, the enemy was able to construct one of the most formidable antiaircraft defenses the world has even seen. Itincluded MIG forces, surface-to-air missile (SAM)batteries, heavy concentrations of antiaircraft artillery (AAA) units, and an array of early warning radar systems. These elements sought to interdictand defeat the U. S. bombing campaign againstNorth Vietnam's lines of communication and itsmilitary and industrial base. The primary mission of U. S. fighter pilots was to prevent the North Vietnamese MIG's from interfering with U. S. strikeoperations. This book tells how American airmen-assisted by an armada of other USAF aircraft whose crews refueled their planes, warned of approaching enemy MIG's and SAM's, and flew rescue missions when they were shot down managed to emerge from their aerial battles withboth victories and honor.

Pacific Counterblow tells the story of the Battle for Guadalcanal (1942), focusing on the operations of the 11th Bombardment Group and the 67th Fighter Squadron. Months after the devastation of Pearl Harbor, U. S. forces had crushed the Japanese fleet at Midway and then moved to seize the initiative. AAF commanders in the Pacific sought to prevent the enemy from severing Australia's supply lines. So the B-17s of the 11th Bomb Group and the P-39s and P-400s of the 67th Fighter Squadron, flying from makeshift bases at Espiritu Santo and Henderson Field, began grueling attacks on Japanese shipping between Rabaul, New Britainand the Solomon Islands. After several months of bitter fighting, American forces gained control of Guadalcanal, positioning them to swing forward beyond Rabaul to New Guinea.

This is the second in a series of interim reports published by Headquarters, Army Air Forces. The original manuscript was prepared by Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Eighth Air Force, on the basis of official records and firsthand observation. This text has been abridged and edited in order to provide for combat personnel in all theaters a succinct summary of the planning and execution of the tactical use of heavy bombardment in the invasion of Normandy. The conscientious and able work of staff personnel in the theaters makes possible the publication of this series, the intent of which is to cover the more important campaigns and individual missions in all theaters of operations.

The Air Force History and Museums Program has prepared accounts of the United States Air Force and the war in Southeast Asia according to a design that reflects the compartmentalized nature of the conflict itself. Besides the special studies like the illustrated history (The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961-1973: An Illustrated Account) and the monographs, some of them quite lengthy, on topics like rescue or tactical airlift, the Air Force history program has published volumes on the air wars over South Vietnam and Cambodia, North Vietnam, and Laos. This book is the last of three recounting operations in Laos, one of them dealing with the war in the northern part of that kingdom and the other two with aerial interdiction in the south. This history covers the critical years from 1968 through 1972, when the Air Force carried out the Commando Hunt series of aerial interdiction campaigns against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos, trying, in conjunction with ground actions, to use air power and electronics to impede the movement of men and supplies from North Vietnam to the battlefields of South Vietnam. Conducted during the time the United States was withdrawing ground forces and turning the war over to the greatly strengthened armed forces of South Vietnam, Commando Hunt sought to prevent a North Vietnamese offensive that would take advantage of the declining U. S. presence. That attack did not come until March 1972 and not only stopped short of overrunning South Vietnam, but also was a setback for the Hanoi government and a cease-fire agreement. The invasion, however, signaled the end of Commando Hunt, for the South Vietnamese did not take over the electronic surveillance network-with its computer, sensors, and communications equipment-that made the series of aerial interdiction operations possible." The real war," said Walt Whitman, "will never get in the books." Yet, even though they cannot conjure up the realities of death and suffering, heroism and sacrifice, books like this have a purpose, offering the counsel of the past to help today's policy makers. What useful principle can they derive from an account of the events of a few years in a unique part of the world? Stripped of all that links it to a particular time, place, and strategy, this narrative warns them that a determined enemy may be able to use geography, climate, and ingenuity to blunt the cutting edge of technology. Against such a foe, what seems flawless in theory or has succeeded brilliantly in tests may fail in actual combat, but what fails on one battlefield may succeed years later on another. In the last analysis, military genius does not reside in compiling lists of lessons learned, but in analyzing the past and applying its distilled wisdom in new, perhaps unique, circumstances.

Air Operations in the Lebanon Crisis of 1958 is one in a series of studies on air operations in international incidents prepared by the USAF Historical Division Liaison Office at the request of the Directorate of Plans, Headquarters USAF. Written in 1959, this study is based chiefly on the raw materials of historical writing--messages and correspondence--and command and unit reports on the operations available at that time. State Department, JCS, Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps materials were used in its preparation. Originally prepared in a very few copies, the study has nevertheless been extensively used within the Air Staff, the JCS, and in the Department of Defense. In response to many requests for wider dissemination of the study, DCS/Plans and Programs, Headquarters USAF, has concurred in its reproduction for a larger distribution. Written by Dr. Robert D. Little and Mrs. Wilhelmine Burch, this study is of special significance in connection with planning and preparations for local wars and incidents. In this operation the American forces experienced no combat action, but the possibility of action was constant and the deployment of forces to the objective area was of first importance. To achieve a meaningful historical context for the military operations, the political and diplomatic background has been presented in some detail.

This study is concerned primarily with the concluding phase of the program to develop a nuclear-propelled aircraft for manned flight. Covering the period from January 1959 to March 1961, it seeks to make clear the factors that brought about the termination of the program. The emphasis is on the policy-management level, and technological factors are dealt with only to the extent that they became involved at that level. A summary review is given of the earlier phase from1946 through 1958. For this phase the study draws heavily, though by no means exclusively, from a historical study prepared by the Wright Air Development Center in 1959, The USAF Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Program. Charts and tables areprovided in an appendix to summarize the financial support of the program and to illustrate the organizational structure for its management. Nuclear Propulsion for Manned Aircraft is part of the larger History of Headquarters USAF, Fiscal Year 1960. It is being published separately to make it more readily available throughout the Air Force.

Probably no phase of recent Air Force history has been more significant than the development of strong general purpose forces to deter or win limited conflicts, including the "wars of nationalliberation" advocated by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in January 1961. Strengthening USAF General Purpose Forces, 1961-1964, an account of this buildup, also includes a brief summary of the change in national military policy which gave rise to it. The author discusses the viewpoints of the top planners in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force and in Headquarters USAF. At the same time, he describes how these officials adjusted to the military policy inaugurated by President John F. Kennedy and his Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara. Concurrently, the author notes how the growing emphasis on general purpose forces required closer coordination with the other military services, especially the Army, and aggravated the problems of interservice support. The buildup of tactical forces took place in a period of growing world tension and simultaneously with other important national programs, such as the exploration of space and attempts to improve the domestic economy. Resulting strains on the national budget and the unfavorable balance of gold payments created numerous and sometimes unforeseen difficulties. Prepared as part of a continuing History of Headquarters USAF, this study is being issued separately to make it available quickly in a conveniently usable form. A companion study by the same author, Strengthening USAF Airlift forces, 1961-1964, covers a related phase of U. S. preparations to resist aggression by limited means.

This is the first in a series of research studies-historical works that were not published for various reasons. Yet, the material contained therein was deemed to be of enduring value to Air Force members and scholars. These works were minimally edited and printed in a limited edition to reach a small audience that may find them useful. We invite readers to provide feedback to the Air Force History and Museums Program. Capt. Betty L. Barton Christiansen, a member of the staff in the Office of Air Force History, researched and wrote this volume. She begins by establishing a framework of the civic action concept. Chapter II discusses the period corresponding to the Kennedy administration, when both government and military officials grappled with adjusting to a "new kind of war," the origins of counterinsurgency strategy (of which civic action was a part), and the efforts to apply this strategy in Vietnam. The nation-building period discussed in Chapter III, covers the period from November 1963 to July 1965, a time of great instability in South Vietnam, and the myriad efforts by the USAF to establish unity. Although he had promised to continue the policies of President Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson began to "lean away" from political and other non-military solutions to the crisis in Vietnam. This was reflected in the attitudes of the various services toward unconventional warfare and civic action. By 1966, while military solutions occupied center stage, some stability had been established in Vietnam. More attention was being paid to winning popular allegiance and USAF's Seventh Air Force formally organized its civic action activities. However, just as the program showed signs of success, the Tet offensive intervened. Thus, Chapter V demonstrates that instead of serving as advisers to the Vietnamese, the USAF civic action effort was compelled to revert to an earlier phase of its development, when humanitarian services were emphasized. Still, the program recuperated completely by July 1968. In Chapter VI, the South Vietnamese government embarked on an accelerated pacification program to extend its control throughout the country. Civic action constituted one part of this effort. Seventh Air Force sought to improve training civic action personnel, increase the number of civic action officers "in country," and obtain more resources for the program. These refinements provided a better understanding of civic action and showed the benefits of increased South Vietnamese participation. By the end of 1968, pacification had become a major part of allied strategy in Vietnam. The results of the various changes in the civic action program are discussed and assessed.

This is the first in a series of research studies-historical works that were not published for various reasons. Yet, the material contained therein was deemed to be of enduring value to Air Force members and scholars. These works were minimally edited and printed in a limited edition to reach a small audience that may find them useful. We invite readers to provide feedback to the Air Force History and Museums Program. Capt. Betty L. Barton Christiansen, a member of the staff in the Office of Air Force History, researched and wrote this volume. She begins by establishing a framework of the civic action concept. Chapter II discusses the period corresponding to the Kennedy administration, when both government and military officials grappled with adjusting to a "new kind of war," the origins of counterinsurgency strategy (of which civic action was a part), and the efforts to apply this strategy in Vietnam. The nation-building period discussed in Chapter III, covers the period from November 1963 to July 1965, a time of great instability in South Vietnam, and the myriad efforts by the USAF to establish unity. Although he had promised to continue the policies of President Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson began to "lean away" from political and other non-military solutions to the crisis in Vietnam. This was reflected in the attitudes of the various services toward unconventional warfare and civic action. By 1966, while military solutions occupied center stage, some stability had been established in Vietnam. More attention was being paid to winning popular allegiance and USAF's Seventh Air Force formally organized its civic action activities. However, just as the program showed signs of success, the Tet offensive intervened. Thus, Chapter V demonstrates that instead of serving as advisers to the Vietnamese, the USAF civic action effort was compelled to revert to an earlier phase of its development, when humanitarian services were emphasized. Still, the program recuperated completely by July 1968. In Chapter VI, the South Vietnamese government embarked on an accelerated pacification program to extend its control throughout the country. Civic action constituted one part of this effort. Seventh Air Force sought to improve training civic action personnel, increase the number of civic action officers "in country," and obtain more resources for the program. These refinements provided a better understanding of civic action and showed the benefits of increased South Vietnamese participation. By the end of 1968, pacification had become a major part of allied strategy in Vietnam. The results of the various changes in the civic action program are discussed and assessed.

The Air Force and the Worldwide Military Command and Control System, 1961-1965, is a companion volume to Arthur K. Marmor's USAF Command and Control Problems, 1958-1961. It seeks to trace major developments in the continuing effort to provide the nation's leaders with command and control facilities for assessing and responding to crises which require, or might require, commitment of America's military forces. Since decisions on most of these developments are made by the President or the Office of the Secretary of Defense it is frequently difficult to pinpoint the Air Force role in them. They remain very much a part of Air Force history, however. The Air Force contributes many of its most highly skilled officers to the joint agencies that build, operate, and support elements of the worldwide military command and control system. Air Staff officers serve on the joint planning groups that conceive the facilities. And nearly every Air Staff section furnishes support to these planning groups