U. S. Air Force

This book seeks to recount the air experience and development before World War II, to describe the objectives, plans and effects of strategic air warfare in Europe and in the Pacific, and to offercriticism, opinion, and lessons of that great conflict. In retrospect I find that I have been singularly fortunate in my associations and assignments. I have been associated with many great men and have been in position to observe great events. In the decade before World War II, I had a priceless opportunity to work with Bob Olds, Harold Lee George, Ken Walker, Don Wilson, and Muir "Santy" Fairchild, under the guidance, inspiration, and benign protection of the Commandant of the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field, Col. John F. Curry. My associates also included Ira C. Eaker, who combined great ability as a staff executive with superlative leadership as Commanding General of the Eighth Air Force inEngland. I worked under that superb airman, Carl "Tooey" Spaatz, Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe. I was caught up in the dedication and driving spirit of Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Forces, Air Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force. And I had the special privilege of working for the greatest soldier of our day, and perhaps of any day, a man of superb integrity and highest character: Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Catlett Marshall. The observations contained in this book constitute a memoir, with all the shortcomings of faulty memory, bias, personal viewpoint, personal experience, and inadequate research that are implied in the term. They lead to speculation on probable results of alternative actions or conditions, and that speculation is likewise suspect because it reflects personal judgment. But the compendium may lead others to derive lessons and conclusions which fit into a broader mosaic.

The Quest for an Advanced Manned Strategic Bomber: USAF Plans and Policies 1961-1966, is an account of the USAF effort to find a replacement for the B-52 and, though with lesser urgency, the B-58. Although three successive Chiefs of Staff, Generals Thomas D. White, Curtis E. LeMay and John P. McConnell, have given top priority to this effort, the Air Force has not yet obtained permission to develop an advanced manned bomber. Instead, it has received approval for a bomber version of the F-111 to replace the older model B-52's. This study examines the principal manned bomber programs in progress between 1961 and 1966. One section, therefore, is devoted to each of three undertakings: the B-70, a supersonic, high-altitudebomber that was completed as an experimental type; the advanced manned strategic aircraft, judged technologically less ambitious than the B-70 but better able to penetrate enemy defenses;and the FB-111, which the Air Force considers an interim bomber, adequate to replace the B-52C through B-52F. The last section also treats the planned phase out of the older B-52's and the B-58's and recounts Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's views on the role of the manned bomber.

The fight for air superiority began the day the Korean War started and only ended with the armistice three years later. Once the shock ofthe North Koreans' invasion wore off, it did not take long for the United States Air Force, assisted by other United Nations air forces, to destroy the North Korean Air Force. The arrival of the MiG-15 in November 1950, often flown by Soviet pilots, changed things considerably however. For the remainder of the war, bitterly contested air battles were fought almost daily. Yet despite a decided numerical superiority in jet fighters, the Communists were never able to gain air superiority, testament to the skill and training of the UN fighter pilots, primarily those U. S. Air Force airmen flying the magnificent F-86 Sabre.

The United States military space program began at the end of World War II when a few people realized that space flight was now achievable and could be employed to military advantage. Science and technology in the form of advanced radar, jet propulsion, ballistic rockets such as the V-2, and nuclear energy had dramatically altered the nature of war. Army Air Forces Commanding General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold wrote in November1945 that a space ship "is all but practicable today" and could be built "within the foreseeable future." The following month the Air Force Scientific Advisory Group concluded that long-range rockets were technically feasible and that satellites were a "definite possibility." The U. S. Navy also expressed interest in space flight. In November 1945 the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics produced a satellite report, and, on March 7, 1946proposed an interservice space program. The idea was presented to the joint Army-Navy Aeronautical Board on April 9. Major General Curtis E. LeMay, the Director of Research and Development for the Army Air Forces, however, viewed space operations as an exclusive Air Forcedomain, and he ordered an independent study.

This study highlights USAF plans, policies, and operations in Southeast Asia during 1965, especially as they were significantly changed by the President's key decisions to bomb North Vietnam and transform the U. S. advisory role in South Vietnam to one of active military support. The author focuses on USAF participation in the development of policy for prosecuting the war, the build-up of U. S. military strength in the theater, and the gradually intensified air operations against enemy forces in South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and Laos. USAF Plans and Operations in Southeast Asia, 1965 follows two other recent studies by the USAF Historical Division Liaison Office dealing specifically with the war: USAF Plans and Policiesin South Vietnam and Laos, 1964 and USAF Plans and Policies in South Vietnam, 1961-1963. In addition, the USAF Historical Division Liaison Office is currently preparing a companion study of Air Force plans and policies dealing with personnel, logistics, construction, and other activities during 1965 in support of the operational forces in Southeast Asia.

USAF Logistic Preparations for Limited War, 1958-1961, discusses a vital military problem that faced the Air Force during these years of international crises. When the full meaning of the limited war threat was recognized it became necessary to provide logistic readiness for limited war operations while firmly maintaining the capability to wage general war. The author, Charles H. Hildreth, has discussed the causes for the change in policy, efforts to improve the war readiness materiel posture, availability of conventional weapons, procurement of aircraft, training of crews, and airlift capability. This study is part of the larger History of Headquarters USAF, Fiscal Year 1960. It is classified Secret to conform with the classification assigned to sources of information used herein.

America's mind's eye carries all too many painful pictures of terrorist actions against her: the collapsed Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, a gapinghole at the waterline of USS Cole, and shocked, bleeding casualties sitting in the streets of the U. S. embassy in Kenya, as well as fire blossoming from New York City's Twin Towers. Another enduring image is the shredded walls of Khobar Towers where nineteen airmen gave their final full measure on June 25, 1996. This account of the Khobar Towers bombing, so eloquently narrated by Dr. Perry Jamieson, tells the story of the horrific attack and the magnificentresponse of airmen doing their duty under nearly impossible circumstances. None of them view their actions as heroic, yet the reader will marvel at their calm professionalism. All of them say it was just their job, but the reader will wonder how they could be so well trained to act almost instinctively to do the right thing at the right time. None of them would see their actions as selfless, yet countless numbers refused medical attention until the more seriously injured got treatment. Throughout this book, the themes of duty, commitment, and devotion to comrades resoundingly underscore the notion that America's brightest, bravest, and best wear her uniforms in service to the nation. This book is more than heroic actions, though, for there is also controversy. Were commanders responsible for not adequately protecting their people? What should one make of the several conflicting investigations following the attack? Dr. Jamieson has not shied away from these difficult questions, and others, but has discussed them and other controversial judgments in a straightforward and dispassionate way that will bring them into focus for everyone. It is clear from this book that there is a larger issue than just the response to the bombing. It is the issue of the example set by America's airmen. Future airmen who read this book will be stronger and will stand on the shoulders of those who suffered and those who made the ultimate sacrifice. No matter what conclusions the reader might each, one continues to return to the magnificent actions of young Americans far from home workingin grueling conditions, who just do their duty. A duty they do without equivocation and for the love of their country and their service. Ultimately, then, this is a story of victory, because the Air Force learned from Khobar Towers. It learned about a ruthless enemy, and all airmen will learn, too, that even under the most devastating conditions, they can fight back and win, a lesson that the world's terrorists have yet to learn. But learn they will.

USAF Plans and Operations: The Air Campaign Against North Vietnam, 1966, is the seventh of a series of historical studies on the war in Southeast Asia prepared by the USAF Historical Division Liaison Office. The previous monographs covered plans, policies, and operations in the theater beginning in 1961. The current history reviews the political background and top level discussions leading to the renewed bombing campaign in early1966, the restrictions still imposed on air operations, and the positions taken on them by the military chiefs. It discusses the various studies and events which led to the President's decisionto strike at North Vietnam's oil storage facilities and the results of those mid-year attacks. It also examines the increasing effectiveness of enemy air defenses and the continuing assessments of the air campaign under way at year's end.

This historical report reviews plans and policiesaffecting the air war in Southeast Asia. as they were discussed, reviewed, and ordered implemented in 1970 by the White House, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Air Force. It is the fourteenth in a series of such reports published by the Office of Air Force History since 1965. In this study, the author discusses the Air Force's role in supporting the President's decisions to withdraw American ground troops from the theater and rely primarily on air power to provide continuing U. S. support to the South Vietnamesein their fight against Hanoi's military units. Sheexamines the Washington-level decisions of early 1970 to reduce U. S. air operations while taking additional steps to strengthen Saigon's armed forces. The author also reviews the debates among Washington-level agencies on the effectiveness of the various air campaigns, and she devotes a chapter to USAF efforts to improve and modernize the Vietnamese Air Force.

General Kenney Reports is a classic account of a combat commander in action. General George Churchill Kenney arrived in the SouthwestPacific theater in August 1942 to find that his command, if not in a shambles, was in dire straits. The theater commander, General DouglasMacArthur, had no confidence in his air element. Kenney quickly changed this situation. He organized and energized the Fifth Air Force, bringing in operational commanders like Whitehead and Wurtsmith who knew how to run combat air forces. He fixed the logistical swamp, making supply and maintenance supportive of air operations, and encouraging mavericks such as Pappy Gunn to make new and innovative weapons and to explore new tactics in airpower application. The result was a disaster for the Japanese. Kenney's airmen used air power-particularly heavily armed B-25 Mitchell bombers used as commerce destroyers-to savage Japanese supply lines, destroying numerous ships and effectively isolating Japanese garrisons. The classic example of Kenney in action was the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, which marked the attainment of complete Allied air dominance and supremacy over Japanesenaval forces operating around New Guinea. In short, Kenney was a brilliant, innovative airman, who drew on his own extensive flying experiences to inform his decision-making. GeneralKenney Reports is a book that has withstood the test of time, and which should be on the shelf of every airman

This volume, a preliminary, groundbreaking effort planned and produced within a prescribed period of time, is intended as a reference work offering historical perspective on current basing issues. It examines four critical periods in the history of USAF basing. During the first period, from 1907 through August 1947, expansion of the Army's air force in response to two major wars established a foundation for the current basing network. The second period, September 1947 through 1960, saw a rapid expansion to support the rise of the United States Air Force as the major instrument of strategic deterrence. Radical retrenchment, followed by politically enforced stability, characterized the third period, 1961 to 1987. From1961 through the mid-1970s, base infrastructure contracted steadily in response to changes in military threat, budgetary pressures, and the retirement of obsolete aircraft. From 1977 through 1987, strict interpretations of the National Environmental Policy Act effectively paralyzed basing actions, despite a moderate expansion of the force after 1980. During the fourth period, 1988-2003, the ending of theCold War resulted in a substantial drawdown of force structure. The reality of sharply reduced forces, in combination with budgetary pressures, created a political consensus that permitted base closures and realignments to resume. Through1987, the decision to open or close bases was, at least formally, strictly an executive branch prerogative. Beginning in 1988, the establishment of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission initiated the formal participation of Congress in basing decisions. The decision to open or close bases during the first three periods - 1907 through August 1947, September 1947 through 1960, and 1961 to 1988- was, at least formally, strictly an executive branch prerogative. During the fourth period,1988-2003, the establishment of the Base Realignment and Closure process initiated formal participation by Congress in basing decisions. In 2003, the Department of Defense began preparing for yet another Base Realignment and Closure Commission Review intended to eliminate unnecessary infrastructure. This study offers the public a historical perspective on BRAC-directed actions by documenting and explaining rationales that have informed the decisions to locate the major operational units and activities within the continental United States, excluding Alaska, during these periods

The publication of The Literature of Aeronautics, Astronautics, and Air Power is part of a continuing series of historical studies from the Office of Air Force History in support of Project Warrior. Project Warrior seeks to create and maintain within the Air Force an environment where Air Force people at all levels can learn from the pastand apply the war-fighting experiences of past generations to the present. When General Lew Allen, Jr. initiated this project in 1982, he called for the "continuing study of military history, combat leadership, the principles of war and, particularly, the applications of air power." All of us in the Air Force community can benefit from such study and reflection. The challenges of today and the future demand no less.

The papers in this volume are those presented at the Air Force Academy on September 30 and October 1, 1976. They are arranged into four sections: '"The Frontier and American Military Tradition," "Comparison of Military Frontiers," "Impact of the Military on the Frontier," and "Military Life on the Frontier." Papers in thefirst two sections address the broad sweep of the military experience on the frontier. These papers help provide perspective and conceptualframework within which to fit the more specific studies in the third and fourth sections. The fifth section, "The Seventh Military History Symposium in Perspective" includes the reactions and commentary of three leading military historians. With a few exceptions the papers and commentary in this volume are presented in the order in which they were delivered at the symposium. The Military History Symposium series began in 1677 as an annual event sponsored by the USAF Academy and the Association of Graduates. Since 1970, the symposia have been held biennially. Thepurpose of the series is to provide a forum for scholars in military history and related fields, thereby promoting an exchange of ideas andinformation between scholars and military professionals, another link between thought and application in military affairs.

In the mid 1990s, several individuals in the Office of the Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force (OCMSAF) began working on biographical sketches of the former chief master sergeants of the Air Force (CMSAFs). Based primarily on published materials, these sketches traced the careers of each of the men who had served in the top enlisted post in the United States Air Force (USAF). In addition, the authors wrote essays dealing with various aspects of enlisted history, such as the role of the first sergeant, enlisted training and education, and the enlisted uniform. The manuscript also contained data on the number of active duty enlisted personnel, the names and tenures of the CMSAFs, and a list of people who had been awarded the Order of the Sword. The goal was to produce, in a single volume, a sense of the history and heritage of Air Force enlisted personnel. The Air Force History Support Office (AFHSO) at Bolling Air Force Base (AFB), Washington, D. C., reviewed the original manuscript, "Enlisted Footprints." While the historians and editors there saw value in the project, they noted that, because the manuscript had been put together by many people working somewhat independently, it needed an overall editor. Initially, the idea was to replace the individual essays with one overall essay on enlisted history, copyedit the biographical sketches for consistency, and select more informative appendixes. This initial work was completed in 2001. However, by the time the manuscript had been completed, the goals had changed. The end product still had to be a history of USAF enlisted personnel, but the biographical sketches needed greater depth and to focus more on the achievements of the chief master sergeants of the Air Force and the issues they faced. Moreover, the essay on enlisted history was to be further refined and expanded. In late 2002, the OCMSAF and the AFHSO once again subjected the manuscript to a more comprehensive editorial review. The process included questionnaires for and interviews of the surviving former CMSAFs. The chiefs were eager to see the project through and were very helpful in providing the information needed to edit and expand their biographies. The Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), the Enlisted Heritage Hall, the Air Force Sergeants Association, and the AFHSO all provided research assistance. The final product, Generations of Chevrons, builds on two works previously published by the Air Force History and Museums Program: The Enlisted Experience: A Conversation with the Chief Master Sergeants of the Air Force and Foundation of the Force: Air Force Enlisted Personnel Policy. The biographical sketches, which were central to the project from the start, remain and add a very human element to the history. Our hope is that this work, especially the historical essay, will add to the growing conversation on the meaning and importance of major themes in USAF enlisted history.

As we enter the Bicentennial anniversary year commemorating out nation's independence, a flood of scholarly writings on the RevolutionaryWar is being turned out by book publishers and scholarly periodicals. One special conference after another, together with a larger-than-usual numberof sessions at the annual convention meetings of the major professional history organizations, is devoted to an examination of our Revolutionaryheritage. In recent years historians have begun to ask new questions about the circumstances that surrounded the achievement of American independence, have begun to examine the everyday aspects of life and death in that era, have emphasized the study of society "from the bottom up" instead of "from the top down," and have sharpened their analytical skills through the use of new kinds of evidence and new kinds of tools such as computer-assisted statistical runs. With the plethora of conference proceedings, articles and books now becoming readily available to the interested reader-enough to satisfy even the most gluttonous reading appetite - why should this publication be so presumptuous as to claim a degree of uniqueness that warrants attention by scholars, students and interested laymen? Somehow in the midst of our celebratory scholarship, the military history of the American Revolution, while certainly not being neglected by historians, has not been accorded a great deal of interest by the reading public. Perhaps that isbecause in the minds of many people so much of past military history has been "blood-and-guts" battle history or self-serving accounts of howvarious high-ranking generals, by dint of fortune or ability, managed almost single handedly to "win" this or that war. Perhaps also our reactionto recent American military involvements has caused an involuntary shrinking away from the study of military history except by dedicatedprofessional historians or by polemicists seeking evidence to support their belief that all military activities are evil and antithetical to basic societalmorality. Despite popular conceptions, not all military history is traditional battle history or memoirs. Mary military historians are asking the samequestions of their subject material and using the same new analytical tools as are their compatriot scholars in other areas of historical research. Theyalso are looking at history from the bottom up to discover the roles of such neglected groups as women, children, Blacks and common soldiers in the various wartime generations. They also are examining more closely the decision-making process to discover why civilian leaders, commanders and soldiers act as they do.

One of the more striking aspects of the war in Southeast Asia was the adaptation of existing weapons in the American arsenal to the peculiar needs of an unconventional war. Total air superiority presented to the United Statesgreat opportunities to support ground operations. Very early some in the Air Force saw the need for a system that could saturate the ground with fire for interdicting enemy reinforcements, for supporting ground troops in contact with the enemy, and for defending isolated hamlets and outposts under attack. Such a weapons system had to be able to hit small, often fleetingtargets in difficult terrain, at night, and in bad weather, through thick jungle cover. It had to be flexible and survivable, to linger for a protracted time over targets, and above all it had to possess great firepower. Nothing in the inventory could do all of this, so the Air Force developed the fixed-wing gunship. This volume, written by Lt. Col. Jack S. Ballard during his assignment to the Office of Air Force History, traces the gunship's history from initial conception in the early 1960s through deployment and operations to the end of American combat involvement in early 1973. Gunship theory-flying an airplane in a pylon turn to aim side-mounted guns at a fixed point on the ground-had been known for years. But it tookmen of vision and persistence to mate the theory with modern technology, and then sell the idea to higher authorities. Once the concept had beenaccepted, the resulting family of gunships was designed to meet specific requirements, then modified as requirements changed. The result was one of the most innovative and successful weapons used in the war. As impressive as was the hardware, the author does not ignore the human element. The gunship program had its share of high-level indecision, production snarls, and equipment failure; but these were overcome by sound management and determination. Sometimes tactics were faulty, even dangerous, and had to be adjusted to the realities of combat. Gunship crews enjoyed a relatively wide latitude in methods of attacking individual targets; not infrequently they found themselves acting as airborne commandersdirecting the employment of other strike aircraft. Most of the tactical decisions and a large number of key management decisions were made byofficers of surprisingly junior rank. The gunship story shows that the individual still makes a difference in modern war, no matter what thedependence on technology

The general purpose of the symposium series is to provide a forum in which recognized scholars may present the results of their research in the history of military affairs. This will, hopefully, enhance interest in the subject among both civilian and military historians, while encouraging a continuing interest among members of the armed forces of the United States and the cadets of the United States Air Force Academy in the study of the history of their chosen profession. A basic objective of the annual symposium series is to create a closer link between the academic historian and the military professional designed to achieve a fuller appreciation and better evaluation of past military events. By including the views of the men who participated in past events, the historical record should be enriched. This book, therefore, contains not only the papers and commentaries read at the Second Annual MilitarySymposium, but additional comments which the editor later solicited from military participants in the events described.

In early August 1990, Iraq attacked Kuwait, its small neighbor to the south, with overwhelming forces. U. S. Army General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander in Chief, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), later recalledhow the sudden Iraqi mobilization during late July had misled some U. S. military leaders. "Iraq had used the desert near Basra for training before," he explained, "and at first we thought this might be merely another exercise.... But by the end of July, the Iraqis were no longer confined to the exercise area; they had fanned out southeast and southwest of Basra and pointed themselves toward the Kuwaiti border." On August 2, heavy units of the Republican Guard Forces Commandplunged across that frontier, leading a brutally swift assault. These elite troops quickly overran Kuwait, seized Kuwait City, and, on the second day of the invasion, moved rapidly toward the Saudi Arabian border. By August 6, elements ofeleven divisions were either in or entering the small kingdom south of Iraq. These powerful forces firmly occupied Kuwait and stood poised to invade Saudi Arabia.

The Enlisted Experience: A Conversation with the Chief Master Sergeants of the Air Force offers a vivid, candid, and highly personal account of military life by four of the first five Chief Master Sergeants of the Air Force. Their recollections, captured in a 1987 interview at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, D. C., cover a period of over thirty years-from the early 1940s to the late 1970s. The position of Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force (held by only ten individuals since its establishment in 1966) has given all enlisted service members a representative who has direct access to, and the ability to advise, the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Air Force. It has also imparted to each of the interviewees broad and insightful perspectives on the issues discussed. The careers of the Chief Master Sergeants and the experiences that shaped them reveal that throughout its brief but eventful history the U. S. Air Force has been able to rely completely on the competence, dedication, and absolute professionalism of its enlisted force. Again and again, this force has met the host of challenges that have confronted it at home and around the globe: It tirelessly maintained the aircraft and supported the air crews of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam; it integrated its ranks and welcomed women as equals into the workplace; it has obtained a better quality of life for its members and their families; and it has pursued increasingly demanding education and training programs infast-changing social and technological service milieus. The stories of the Chief Master Sergeants point to an essential fact: The service would be unable to carry out its missions successfully in a dangerousworld without the genuine cooperation of a motivated enlisted corps. That the Air Force almost flawlessly achieved its objectives in Operation DESERT STORM is in no small measure the result of that corps' tradition of striving and excellence.