Kirjojen hintavertailu – 12 903 725 kirjaa ja 27 kauppaa
Kirjafiili

Kirjailija

U. S. Army Command and General Staff Col

Kirjat ja teokset yhdessä paikassa: 421 kirjaa, julkaisuja vuosilta 2014–2017, suosituimpiin kuuluu Opportunities Gained and Lost: J.E.B. Stuart's Cavalry operations in the Seven Days Campaign. Vertaile teosten hintoja ja tarkista saatavuus suomalaisista kirjakaupoista.

421 kirjaa

Kirjojen julkaisuvuodet: 2014–2017.

Rome in the Teutoburg Forest

Rome in the Teutoburg Forest

U. S. Army Command and General Staff Col

Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
2014
nidottu
Role cultural misunderstanding played on the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The Roman commander's cultural misunderstanding of his enemy caused mistakes at the operational and tactical levels, while the Roman Emperor's cultural misunderstanding brought about mistakes at the strategic level and created poor policy decisions following the battle, which affected Rome like no other battle in its history. Chapter 2 examines the consequences of other Roman loses (with much higher casualties) to show how none of them carried the same impact as the Teutoburg loss. They were but temporary "setbacks", while Teutoburg was Rome's first military "defeat" in its history. The Roman direction of conquest into Germania and the image of the pre-Teutoburg Germanic barbarian (an image which changes greatly into an elevated status following the massacre) are also examined. Chapter 3 examines the commanders of both sides and the battle itself. Chapter 4 looks at the significance of this loss. This battle caused Rome to adopt its first permanent defensive boundary and set the first limit of the Roman Empire.
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Major General Philip H. Sheridan and The Employment of His Division During the Battle of Chickamauga

Major General Philip H. Sheridan and The Employment of His Division During the Battle of Chickamauga

U. S. Army Command and General Staff Col

Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
2014
nidottu
This book is a historical analysis of Major General Philip H. Sheridan and his division during the Battle of Chickamauga. Sheridan led an experienced division onto the battlefield on 19 September 1863 after completing a march of over one hundred miles over mountainous terrain the previous seventeen days. The division was deployed by brigade to protect the Union right flank. One brigade took heavy casualties the first day, when attacking to repel an enemy advance. On the second day, while moving to reinforce Major General Thomas' corps, the division was routed when Confederate forces attacked through a gap in the Union defense. Sheridan rallied his men, but inexplicably left the battlefield instead of returning to reinforce Thomas' right flank as ordered. Sheridan later moved to reinforce Thomas' left flank, after the battle was over. Sheridan's performance was uncharacteristic for him, particularly his decision to leave the battlefield. Sheridan was not the subject of an official inquiry after the battle, although his actions were similar to other officers who were. Based on the analysis of the division's actions, this study draws conclusions to determine the causes for the unit's poor performance at Chickamauga: poor decision making, fatigue, and piecemeal employment.
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Is the U.S. Army Field Artillery Prepared to Support the Next Major Combat Operation

Is the U.S. Army Field Artillery Prepared to Support the Next Major Combat Operation

U. S. Army Command and General Staff Col

Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
2014
nidottu
In 2007, three former brigade combat team commanders authored a white paper and sent it to the Army Chief of Staff entitled The King and I: The Impending Crisis in the Field Artillery's Ability to Provide Fire Support to Maneuver Commanders. The paper details the authors' concerns as maneuver commanders with the ability of the field artillery to support maneuver operations. This book examines Operation COBRA to determine how the corps commanders employed field artillery when conducting offensive operations and identifies key concepts that were used to ensure success. The three areas that were seen as crucial to the success of offensive operations were the ability to mass artillery fires, integrate close air support into the ground maneuver plan, and how logistics supported artillery units. For the future of the field artillery, those three areas must be maintained in order to prevail in the next major combat operation.
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Strategists Break All The Rules

Strategists Break All The Rules

U. S. Army Command and General Staff Col

Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
2014
nidottu
Emory Upton believed that politicians should leave war to professionals. This led to two assumptions that became conventional wisdom: first, an apolitical army represented a more professional force; and second, the problems at the tactical and operational level were similar enough to be useful in developing strategic thinking. These assumptions resulted in what Samuel P. Huntington described as the "normal-theory" relationship between policy-makers and generals. The assumption made sense for the United States but had one unfortunate result. The Army as an institution misread the nature of an apolitical force. The essence of an apolitical force should be non-partisan - Army professionals above political interference or interest. There is a difference, however, between policy and politics. While not involving itself in the political life of the nation, the Army is vitally concerned with the policies of the nation. The discussion strategists must prepare for are political, but in the nature of - policy as the object of war. A historical survey of strategists from General Winfield Scott to General Creighton Abrams suggests that the most successful strategists are life-long learners. They build holistic understanding of the interdependent and infinite connections of the whole problem. Once they develop a hypothesis about the whole problem, they reshape those connections to create a better peace for the United States. Strategists that take time to understand the whole problem encourage discourse. Retaining the Functional Area 59 Strategist program will continue to benefit the force because they do not follow a traditional route to generalship. After all, few have earned stars by arguing, debating, and taking intellectual risk.
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United States Cybersecurity Strategy, Policy, and Organization: Poorly Postured to Cope with a Post-9/11 Security Environment

United States Cybersecurity Strategy, Policy, and Organization: Poorly Postured to Cope with a Post-9/11 Security Environment

U. S. Army Command and General Staff Col

Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
2014
nidottu
Is United States cybersecurity strategy, policy, and organization postured to cope with the post-9/11 security environment? Through an exhaustive review of recurring and stand-alone strategic cybersecurity strategy and policy documents and a detailed assessment of the United States cyber organization within the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense, and Department of Justice, the United States is indeed vulnerable to a cyber attack. Despite the recent emphasis on cyber attacks against private and governmental organizations, the genesis of American interest and awareness of cyber threats began during the Clinton Administration. Unfortunately, the quest for improved cybersecurity has experienced uneven progress. Cybersecurity strategy, policy and organization have undergone numerous changes, and each change has attempted to adapt to the dynamic nature of cyberspace. While progress has been made on many fronts, cybersecurity strategy, policy, and organization has not incorporated some of the lessons the Intelligence Community learned from the 9/11 experience. Because of this shortfall, the United States is potentially vulnerable to a devastating cyber attack.
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Angels of Armageddon: The Royal Air Force in the Battle of Megiddo

Angels of Armageddon: The Royal Air Force in the Battle of Megiddo

U. S. Army Command and General Staff Col

Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
2014
nidottu
Egypt and Palestine offered the British an opportunity to fight a war of movement. Unlike the Western Front, Egypt and Palestine were undeveloped with wide expanses of land. It was ripe for the development of maneuver warfare using the mechanical products of the industrial age: motor cars, machine guns, tanks and aeroplanes. In particular, the use of aeroplanes proved vital to the successful British defense of the Suez Canal by providing reconnaissance of enemy formations and early warnings of attack. This role of the Royal Flying Corps expanded in this theater to cover the breadth and depth of British efforts at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. The strategic success of the Royal Air Force in wrestling air superiority from the Germans was the key that allowed the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) to prepare and conduct its campaign against the central powers across the plains surrounding Megiddo. It provided the EEF intelligence of enemy positions, freedom to maneuver forces undetected, and the depth to attack and rout the retreating Turkish forces to the point of annihilation. The evolution of local air superiority in Palestine, properly coordinated with the ground offensive, was the deciding factor for victory in that theater.
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