U. S. Army Command and General Staff Col

The US Department of Defense predicts that ground forces of the future will wage tomorrow's wars by replacing large numbers of personnel and organic firepower for advanced technology and superior maneuverability. Those forces must be prepared to face an unconventional enemy who will operate in small, lethal units interspersed with the civilian population rather than facing coalition forces with massed formations. This scenario of blurred lines of battle and difficulty determining friend from foe resembles very closely what the US military faced in Vietnam. This book will address the successes and failures of United States airborne forward air controllers (FACs), particularly in Vietnam, and whether combat lessons learned were passed from service to service or historically from conflict to conflict. The FAC mission has not significantly changed since the end of the Vietnam War, and a thorough study of operational and tactical lessons learned by those aircrew will significantly enhance today's FACs ability to find and destroy dispersed enemy forces in a wide array of environments.

This study analyzes the Chinese Red Army from 1927 to 1936 to deter-mine how the Red Army survived attacks from external military forces and also successfully overcame the threats to its existence posed by changing Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policies. During this period, the CCP attempted to develop, expand, and professionalize the Chinese Red Army as a way to defend Communist base areas from a series of Kuomingtang (KMT) Extermination Campaigns. Also during these years, changes in the CCP leadership often placed the Red Army in dangerous situations by underestimating the KMT military threat and overestimating Red Army capabilities. This re-examination of the origin and development of the Chi-nese People's Liberation Army looks at the Chinese Red Army's strategy, tactics, organization, and training and identifies four themes that helped it adapt and survive: a pragmatic strategy focused on long-term success; creating local populace support through adaptation; strong soldier recruiting, training, and retention; and a comprehensive officer development system.

This book explores the applicability of current US counterinsurgency doctrine in Joint Publication 3-24, Field Manual 3-24 and Field Manual 3-24.2 to the Lebanese Hizballah and Taliban insurgencies. In particular, this book examines the Cold War operational environment which influenced the writings of Mao Tse Tung, David Galula and Bard O'Neill and contrasts that to the current operational environment in which Lebanese Hizballah and the Taliban operate. Additionally, the book explores the historical evolution of Hizballah and the Taliban and the applicability of current US counterinsurgency doctrine to these two groups. In both case studies the applicability of current doctrine is mixed as doctrine downplays the role of religion and relies upon Maoist insurgency phasing to describe Hizballah and Taliban insurgency evolution. This is especially misleading with regard to how Hizballah converted itself into a major political party. The book concludes insurgency doctrine needs to be updated to reflect the current operational environment and recommends expanding the foreign area officer program, reexamining the Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan conflicts to guide counterinsurgency doctrinal development. By implementing these recommendations, senior US Army commanders will improve their ability to conduct Battle Command in counterinsurgency environments.

This book examines the development of the American Army corps structure during World War I. The corps formation developed in World War I by General John J. Pershing was the culmination of 56 years of lessons learned from the Civil War through the beginning of World War I. The success of the American Expeditionary force (AEF) in World War I was, in large part, the result of the development and combat effectiveness of the corps formation. The corps formation allowed commanders flexibility, concentrated firepower, sustainability, and increased command and control. The American corps formation in World War I led the AEF to victory in the Saint Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne campaigns. The American corps formation provided resources and capabilities that helped provide the needed edge to defeat the Central Powers and help end World War I.