Office of Air Force History

The war in the Persian Gulf in 1991 capped an era of USAF modernization and enhanced readiness begun in the late 1970s and that continued through the 1980s. The long lead-time weapons acquisition and training programs, begun adecade or more earlier, came to fruition against a far different opponent and in an unforeseen locale than that envisioned by their creators. The force designed to counter the superpower foe of the Cold War, the USSR, never fought a direct battle against that enemy during the existence of the Soviet Union. Instead, the USAF fought the first war of the so-called New World Order, a war that had as much in common with the colonial wars of the late nineteenth century as it had with the high-technology wars of the late twentieth century. The USAF shouldered the bulk of the fighting for the first thirty-nine of the conflict's forty-two days. This volume covers the air offensive against strategic military and economic targets within the pre-August 1990 borders of Iraq. The offensive air plan once again displayed the ability of the U. S. military to turn the necessity of improvisation into a virtue when, in mid-August 1990, an elementof the Air Staff in the Pentagon wrote the basis of the offensive plan in ten days. The plan was founded upon the precepts of Col. John A. Warden III's air power theories-centers of gravity, shock effect, and the importance of leadership-related targets. Once the outline plan reached the arena of operations, the U. S. CentralAir Forces (CENTAF), under the able leadership of Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner, adopted the targeting philosophy of the plan and, after many modifications owing to new targets and an increased force structure, employed it with devastating effect. The author describes not only the outstanding performance of USAF men and machines but also the difficulties and complexities of coordinating the many elements of air and staff operations. Among these were the complex coordination of the fighters with their tankers, the speedy transmission of data from the allseeing eyes of AWACS and JSTARS aircraft, the multiple bomb runs over chemical and biological warfare bunkers, and the shortcomings of certain types ofintelligence. All these factors impacted on mission effectiveness. The author also diagrams how outside influences-political pressure from neutrals, such as the Israelis, and from public news media-can affect the direction of the bombing effort.

In many ways "Desert Storm" represents a watershed in history; for much of the war, it consisted entirely of the application of massive doses of air power to the economic and bureaucratic infrastructure of Iraq and its military forces. How the Coalition applied air power differed greatly from previous wars in which air forces had played major roles. In this case, air power proved itself capable of use as both a rapier-like instrument and as a bludgeon. By itself, the air campaign achieved considerable effects on the Iraqi military, its infrastructure, its command and control, and even the political stability of the Bathist tyranny. Yet many things remain unclear about the campaign's impact on Iraq. Even the question of how many tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces, and other numerical indices of military power the campaign destroyed or damaged is open to dispute. As for the impact of air power on Iraq's military system, its military industrial complex, and even the regime itself, much of that remains opaque. Nevertheless, even with the imponderables the air campaign suggests that the military balance between air and ground has changed in fundamental ways. Bernard Trainor, the former Marine Corps general, former New York Times military correspondent and current professor at the JFK School of Government at Harvard, underlined that shift in a lecture to the Naval War College in October 1991. He noted that for the first time in history the ground campaign had supported the air campaign. This study focuses on the air war's operational conduct against Iraq and its military forces. For our purposes, the USAF's 1992 basic doctrinalmanual provides a useful definition of "operational art," the focus of this report: Operational art. The employment of military forces to attain strategic or operational objectives in a theater of war or in a theater of operationsthrough the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations: Operational art translates theater strategy into operational and, ultimately, tactical action. This report, consequently, focuses on the employment of air power as a part of Coalition military efforts to destroy Iraq's military forces andpotential, and to liberate Kuwait. Within that framework, the air campaign attempted a wide variety of objectives. This apparent diversion ofeffort reflected both the enonnous resources mobilized in the Gulf by the Coalition and fears of military commanders that the Iraqis would exit thewar at an early point, thereby preserving much of their military power.

This report brings together analyses of three crucial determinants of an armed force's overall capability: * weapons-the tools used by the soldier, sailor, and airman, * tactics-the ways in which the tools are used to produce desired effects and, *training-the way in which the individual soldier, sailor, and airman acquires the skills required to combine weapons and tactics into the operational art of warfare. The report focuses on the impact of these three elements on the application of air power projected by the U. S. and Coalition forces in the Gulf War. The information and conclusions presented provide background essential to a more complete understanding of the facts, principles, andprecepts developed and discussed in other volumes of this study. The research to support this report was drawn from several sources. First and foremost, the extensive operational and technical expertise ofthe principal authors and contributors served as a reservoir of knowledge and background. Their primary search for information focused onintelligence estimates, unit reports, flight data bases, and earlier studies pertinent to the task. Additionally, the authors interviewed Gulf Warparticipants from the United States and Coalition countries and obtained volumes of supporting documents and information now resting within theGWAPS archive. Because of time constraints and the ambitious scope of the task, some issues and topics within this report are either addressedonly at the surface or not addressed at all. These issues are usually identified as areas for future study

This report discusses logistics in the Persian Gulf War as it applies to all military operations and in particular to air operations. Simply put, how did the United States equip its forces for Desert Shieldand Desert Storm? Logistics also includes functions for maintaining an air base and support services. These aspects of logistics will be coveredin the two parts of this volume. One of the simpler, but nonetheless comprehensive, definitions of logistics was documented by Baron Antoine Henri Jomini subsequent to the Napoleonic Wars, when he defined logistics as the "practical art of moving armies."' A Joint Chiefs of Staff definition expands on Jomini's version, expressing logistics asThe science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: a. design anddevelopment, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition, or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services. *The Gulf War encompassed all of these aspects of logistics, and did so on a grand scale. One of the main reasons for success in this conflict was the ability of the U. S. military to respond logistically-tomove, beddown, and sustain the combat forces. The primary focus of our survey was to examine airpower application in a theater devoid of prioroperational presence. This unique environment presented airpower managers with severe challenges to assure efficient and effective application of combat force. We examine the state of logistics prior to the conflict, the characteristics of planning, the efforts to put combat and supportelements in place, the support of air operations during combat; and in particular, how planners envisioned the role of logistics in supporting airforces to achieve Coalition objectives and execute military strategy.

Arguably, the rise of air power has been the most significant change in warfare during the twentieth century. While World War II demonstrated the tremendous effect and potential of air power, its proper application was misplaced during theVietnam War. There, instead of adhering to the basic tenet of air poweremploying it as an indivisible weapon-political and military leaders parceled out air power among various loosely connected campaigns. The indivisibility ofair power theory also fell victim to doctrinal battles among the services. Fortunately, the United States military relearned the proper applications of air power during the Persian Gulf War and more recently confirmed it in Operation Allied Force, the American-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) campaign over Kosovo. Kosovo demonstrated that the services had bridged the doctrinal divide and progressed toward doctrinal cohesion. Over the past thirty years, the application of air power has received greater emphasis with respect toits purpose, execution, and lower cost. The results have been most beneficial to the security and freedom of the United States and its friends.. Superior technology has enabled the United States to emphasize quality over quantity, talent over mass, firepower over manpower, and innovation over tradition. We have learned that the complacency of our successes threatens our technological superiority. We have also seen our weapons systems acquisition suffer from aponderous, nonproductive process that emphasizes cost over value, administrationover output, and the separation of operators from engineers. To defeat complacency and regain superiority in acquisition, the Department of Defense implemented a series of management reforms that supported continuous competition, concentrated research and development on high-leverage militarily unique technologies, and broke down the barriers between operators and engineers. The accelerating hardware and software revolutions of the 1990s greatly impact the operational aspects of information management and information warfare. To make them integral elements of the same overall system will requirecultural and structural changes as well as significant technology development. The new technology contributes knowledge and speed to the problems of warfare. It answers the basic questions: Where am I? Where are my subordinates? Where is the enemy? Our major difficulties are with information overload andinformation processing. In addition, because American business and commerce are so heavily dependent on computerized information processing, the nation is highly vulnerable to information warfare. Fortunately, our younger generation is fully up to these demands.

Of all the Army Air Forces' many operations inthe Second World War, none was more demandingor important than those supporting the activity of resistance groups fighting the Axis powers. The special operations supporting the Yugoslavianpartisans fighting the forces of Nazism in theBalkans required particular dedication and expertise. Balkan flying conditions demanded the best of flying skills, and the tenacious German defenses in that troubled region complicated this challenge even further. In this study, Professor William Leary examines what might fairly be considered one of the most important early experiencesin the history of Air Force special operations. It is ironic that, fifty years after these activities, the Air Force today is heavily involved in Balkan operations, including night air drops of supplies. But this time, the supplies are for humanitarianrelief, not war. The airlifters committed to relieving misery in that part of the world follow in the wake of their predecessors who, fifty years ago, flew the night skies with courage and skill to help bring an end to Nazi tyranny.

Few nations in modern times have been prepared for war. Even the aggressors who have initiated conflicts have not been fully ready, for they could never be certain how their victims would react or what the clash of arms would bring. Nor, since the industrial revolution of the 19th century accelerated the pace of technological change, could a nation predict the impact of new weapons on battle and decide upon new tactics and strategies necessary for victory. For most of its history, the United States did not trouble itself deeply with problems of preparing for war. With wide oceans separating it from the major powers of the world, and with a tradition isolating it from the balance of power system which governed international relations, this country could afford a military policy predicated on mobilizing after hostilities had begun. Its small peacetime military and naval establishment was designed for border security, for patrol of distant seas and a vast continental interior, for exploration, and after the dawn of the 20th century, for a cadre and training base which would absorb the manpower and materiel of the nation for wartime armed forces. Beginning late in the 19th century, however, technology began to render such a policy increasingly dangerous. The introduction of steeland steam in ship construction and improvements in naval weaponry pushed the nation into overhauling and expanding the peacetime Navy. While the oceans would still provide a barrier and afford an interval for mobilization, defeat at sea would transform the barrier into a highwayfor invasion. To surrender the command of the sea was perceived by the early 20th century to offer an enemy the opportunity to defeat the United States. Similarly, air power shrank the world and promised as much danger as opportunity to the country in defending itself. Proponents of airpower realized that command of the air by an enemy could lay the nation open to bombardment and perhaps defeat. To prevent such a catastropherequired extensive preparation and much practice, thus prompting the expenditure of considerable resources in peacetime. And yet the nation, in the aftermath of World War I - the "war to end all wars"- saw little need for much spending on the implements of war. And in the 1930s, with the onset of the worst depression in American history, economic theory called for reduced government expenditure. For the pioneers of the American air forces, these were difficult years in a struggleas part of the army to forge the air weapons they believed so strongly would decide future warfare.

The second in a series of encyclopedias of U. S. Air Force aircraft and missile systems, this volume covers the development and fielding of bomber aircraft between 1945 and 1973, commencing with the Convair B-36 Peacemaker and ending with the development of the Rockwell International B-1A. Marcelle Knaack's detailed and comprehensive discussion of each bomber type provides a wealth of technical material painstakingly extracted from official Air Force sources. The researcher will find the informationreadily available and easy to use. Equally critical to our understanding of bomber development, however, is the author's treatment of the policy issues and the technological decisionsthat molded each bomber program. During the postwar years, the nation's emerging nuclear capabilities placed new emphasis on developing bombers capable of delivering the atomic weapon. Subsequent military needs in Korea and Southeast Asia, however, required a return to conventional weapons. New technologies continually spawned modifications in the weapons systems. And throughout, the Air Force adapted developmental programs and modified production aircraft to fit new roles, from strategicreconnaissance to tactical operations for the Southeast Asia theater. These pages contain essential data for a wide spectrum of audiences inside and outside the U. S. Air Force. Mrs. Knaack's exacting research and her ability to translate difficult and often conflicting documentation into clear and concise capsule histories will enable planners and those engaged in the research and development of aircraft to benefit from the Air Force's experience. As she points out, the success of the postwar bomber program has been the result of the Air Force's willingness to consider several different developmental pathways simultaneously, to modify existing aircraft astechnology permits, and above all, to assume continually the development risks required to keep the service at the forefront of technology.

This publication is the first of a multi-volume Encyclopedia of U. S. Air Force Aircraft and Missile Systems. Volume I deals with the development, deployment, and operations of fighter aircraft between 1945 and 1973, commencing with theF-80 Shooting Star and ending with the development of the F-15 Eagle. Many of these aircraft were employed during the Korean War, the war in Southeast Asia, and during cold war crises throughout the world. Additional volumes to be published in this series will cover Air Force bombers, transports, trainers, other military aircraft, and missile systems.

During the perilous years of 1940-1941, a small band of Americans joined the Royal Air Force to help England resist Nazi Germany. They did so while the United States remained a neutral power and overcame significant obstacles to accomplish their objective. Over time, the RAF formed three fighter units, known collectively as the Eagle Squadrons, around these volunteer pilots. TheseAmericans flew alongside their British comrades in fighter and bomber escort missions until 1942, when they transferred into the United States Army Air Forces. The Eagle Squadron pilots made noteworthy contributions to the RAF, assisting them in their transition from fighting a defensive war to waging an offensive campaign against the German Luftwaffe and helping pave the way to aneventual Allied victory.

They volunteered. For a variety of reasons-patriotic, altruistic, mercenary, or just "for the hell of it"-nearly three hundred U. S. servicemen and a couple of female nurses volunteered to fight a war in a place they knew little about. Recruited at military bases around the country, the members of the American Volunteer Group (AVG) set off for the unknown in the summer and fall of 1941. While U. S. support for the Allied cause was growing at a steady pace, mostAmericans still felt distanced from the conflict enveloping Europe and Asia and did not want to go to war. At the highest levels of the government, however, entering thewar appeared inevitable. The AVG was one way of gaining experience in this vicious war, while increasing support for the nations fighting the Axis powers. Despite incredible odds against them from numerically superior Japanese forces and a near complete lack of supply and replacement parts, they took the first successful fight to the Japanese during a time of Japan's unrelenting successes. Itwas not pretty, and their legend has eclipsed the reality, but the reality of the AVG is still an amazing story. Led by Claire Lee Chennault, they made history.

On September 11, 2001, the North American Aerospace Defense Command, based at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, under the command of Gen. Ralph E. Eberhart, oversaw three air defense regions, which were responsible for protecting the airspace over Alaska, Canada, and the continental United States. The last of these, the Continental United States NORAD Region (CONR), under the command of the dual-hatted commander of First Air Force, Maj. Gen. Larry K. Arnold, oversaw the Northeast, the Western, and the Southeast Air Defense Sectors. The locations of the departures, flight paths, and crash sites of the four aircraft hijacked on September 11, 2001, were all in the Northeast Air Defense Sector, commanded by Col. Robert K. Marr (see Diagram, NORAD Air DefenseStructure on 9/11, p 53). On September 11, 2001, the responsibility for defending continental U. S. airspace rested with only fourteen fighter aircraft at seven air defense alert sites across the country. Based in Rome, New York, the Northeast Air Defense Sector had only two alert sites on which to call-Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and Langley Air Force Base in Hampton, Virginia. Each site had two designated alert fighters on duty twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Many other fighter aircraft were based across the country, but they were not NORAD assets, and it would take time to arm them and organize their crews.

In this short study you will meet several such families, and you will learn about their relationships and the reasons some have seen a clear path that has been forged by the generations ahead of them. Myriad reasons motivate these multiple generations of Airmen, some of which are clearly expressed, while others are just felt: honor, pride, responsibility, patriotism, courage. The author herself is experiencing the family tie of common service: she served as an active duty, now reserve, officer; her husband served as an active duty enlisted man and officer and is now an Air Force civilian. Her grandfathers served during World War II, Korea, and Vietnam; and as of the writing of this foreword, her brother-in-law is in the process of enlisting. Generational succession, legacies if you will, are certainly not unusual in the Air Force, or the other services for that matter. The twenty-one families you will meet in the pamphlet only scratch the surface. They represent a much larger body-one that serves the nation, subordinates its personal desires to the greater good, and makes history every day. We are confident you will find their stories interesting and uplifting.

Great Game to 9/11 was initially begun as an introduction for a larger work on U. S./coalition involvement in Afghanistan. It provides essential information for an understanding of how thisisolated country has, over centuries, become a battleground for world powers. Although an overview, this study draws on primary sourcematerial to present a detailed examination of U. S.-Afghan relations prior to Operation Enduring Freedom.

On July 29, 1972 Air Force F-4s and North Vietnamese MiG-21s engaged fifty miles northeast of Hanoi. The F-4s shot down two MiGs, and the MiGs shot down an F-4 whose callsign was Trigger 4 (the fourth F-4 in a flight of four). Such is the historical record, but some pilots thought the record was wrong. They suspected that only one MiG fell, and that the second kill was really Trigger 4, a victim of fratricide perpetrated by Cadillac 1, the lead F-4 of another flight of four on a MiG sweep out of Udorn, Thailand. Fortunately, the two-man crew of Trigger 4 survived the shootdown and several months of imprisonment in Hanoi. In the mid-1990's, an Air Force Reserve colonel conducted research on Trigger 4's loss. His skill and persistence permitted him to gather an impressive body of data on this one engagement. He reached a preliminary conclusion that it was "highly probable" Trigger 4 had been a victim of fratricide. Yet, he knew his conclusion was based on circumstantial evidence; he had no smoking gun. In 2000, the pilot of Trigger 4, who was aware of the Air University researcher's findings, wrote to the Air Force Chief of Staff and asked that the matter be investigated fully. In response the Chief of Staff directed a team of experts to reconstruct the air battle of July 29, 1972 to determine the facts surrounding Trigger 4's shootdown. He also appointed a non-partisan senior mentor to monitor the team's thoroughness and methodology. The Project Trigger team began work in the Checkmate division of the operations directorate. They built upon the foundation provided by the Air University researcher. Even though this air-to-air battle occurred nearly 29 years ago, the team found and interviewed 27 participants and other interested observers of the battle. The team was fortunate to be able to synchronize five cockpit tapes, including three from the F-4 flight leaders in the battle, and two others from the flight whose kill was in question. Using the tapes, eyewitness accounts, intelligence records, and the team's considerable experience, they reconstructed theengagement, and determined that a MiG-21 shot down Trigger 4. As the reader sees the story unfold, it becomes clear that there are important lessons. None of the three aircrews shot down in this engagement realized they were under attack until it was too late. But firing beyond visual range is also risky, and the system of rules in place today is the direct result of experiences from air battles such as this one. A culture of discipline in the Air Force is animportant part of what makes it the best in the world. "Get the first shot" may be axiomatic, but identifying the target is even more basic.

This monograph on the forecasting of long-range Air Force science began as an attempt to describe the five major scientific studies undertaken by the U. S. Army Air Forces (USAAF)/U. S. Air Force (USAF) since the end of World War II. These reports included Toward New Horizons (1945), the Woods Hole Summer Studies (1957-1958), ProjectForecast (1964), New Horizons II (1975), and Project Forecast II (1986). They seemed at first to represent nothing more than isolated efforts to predict the technological future. But shortly after initiating research on the subject, it became clear that several themes linked the five reports. Rather than a collection of unrelated analyses, common threads were seen to run through them. The realization of this pattern was surprising. Taken at face value, the reports appeared to be entirely different. They were not produced in any one place; they were not directed by people with similar backgrounds or educations. Both in number and type of participants, they differed widely. Methodologies were not at all uniform. Their conclusions varied significantly. In fact, they did not even have the same purposes. Toward New Horizons was initiated to summarize the most advanced air power technologies of World War II and project them into the future . The Woods Hole Summer Studies organized hundreds of academic scientists to predict the short and long-term military uses of space. Project Forecast had themandate of revitalizing Air Force thinking by linking national policy issues to scientific vistas and new weapon systems. New Horizons II endeavored to point the way toward technological improvements in a period of expected scarcity. Finally, Project Forecast II sought to infuse theAir Force laboratories with new avenues of basic science research. Thus, for a variety of internal and external reasons, at roughly ten year intervals since the Second World War, the Air Force launched major science and technology forecasts.

The issue of close air support by the United States Air Force in support of, primarily, the United States Army has been fractious for years. Aircommanders have clashed continually with ground leaders over the proper use of aircraft in the support of ground operations. This is perhaps not surprising given the very different outlooks of the two services on what constitutes proper air support. Often this has turned into a competition between the two services for resources to execute and control close air support operations. Although such differences extend well back to the initial use of the airplane as a military weapon, in this book the author looks at the period 1946-1973, a period in which technological advances in the form of jet aircraft, weapons, communications, and other electronic equipment played significantroles. Doctrine, too, evolved and this very important subject is discussed in detail. Close air support remains a critical mission today and the lessons of yesterday should not be ignored. This book makes a notable contribution inseeing that it is not ignored.

In this study of the origins and evolution of the Air National Guard, Dr. Charles. Gross, himself a former guardsman and a professional historian, currently at the Air Force Systems Command History Office, chronicles this transformation. In the 1940s, the active duty Air Force was not particularly sympathetic or supportive of an Air National Guard. Focused on creating an Air Force as a separate service, carving out its role in the air-atomic age, and changing from piston to jet engines in an austere budgetary environment, the regulars saw no real purpose for part-time, state air forces. If anything, an Air Guard threatened thefunding of an adequate regular force. Given the Guard's record of poor readiness and its successful resistance to direction from Washington, the Air Force leadership would have been just as happy to see the Guard eliminated. In 1950, the difficult and in many respects unsuccessful mobilization of the Air National Guard for the Korean War, forced the Air Force into reforms, and the Guard itself to accept greater peacetime control by the active force. Through the 1950s, by means of expansion, more modern aircraft, and more closely coordinatedplanning and policy-making, the Guard began to increase both in effectiveness and in the respect it engendered from the Air Force leadership. Late in the decade, increased budgetary pressure on the Air Force, combined with the Eisenhower administration's emphasis on reserves and the Congress' support for the Guard, led to a more favorable view of the Guard by the Air Force. Also, Air Guard leaders themselves realized that they had to institute various reforms and better integrate the Guard with the regular force. Most importantly, the Guard in the 1950s won for itself, in continental air defense, in tactical aviation, and in airlift, meaningful missions that it could perform effectively on a continuing basis in peacetime. In mobilizations during the Berlin crisis in 1961-1962, in the Pueblo crisis and the Southeast Asian War in 1968, the Guard proved its competence and excellence. The expanding role of the Guard and its close cooperation with the Air Force are Dr. Gross' themes, explaining the rise of the Guard to the prominence it plays in today's air operations. He pulls no punches in recounting the conflict betweenGuard and regular Air Force, or in explaining how each side maneuvered to safeguard its interests. However, the author also shows how common concerns and mutual dedication to the national defense overcame parochialism and led fromcooperation to integration. The result was displayed for all the Air Force to see in the professionalism of Guard units in the 1960s mobilizations. Guard and regular Air Force had become vital to each other; in return for modern aircraft, a substantial peacetime mission, and upon mobilization integration into the wartimeforce, the Guard accepted de facto control by the regular Air Force. As Dr. Gross concludes, the concept of "state militia" was altered far beyond the changes wrought earlier in federal-state military relations. The Air Guard was ready for the'Total Force" policy of the 1970s. The dilemma of maintaining a reserve fully capable of fighting the air war was solved. By the 1980s, the Air National Guard, at the same time inheritors of a military tradition extending back before 1776, and users of the most advanced technologies of war, could prove that citizen-soldiers need not be second to any airman in the world

Since the days of ancient warfare, commanders have relied on science and technology for success in war. Their use in military affairs increaseddramatically after the Scientific and Industrial Revolutions, particularly in the nineteenth century. For example, chemists and metallurgistscontributed greatly to World War I, while World War II is sometimes referred to as the physicists' war. During the fifty-year conflict known as the Cold War, scientists from diverse disciplines collaborated to multiply the effectiveness of military force and meet national security needs. Of all the federal organizations devoted to science and technology, none has been more important or influential than the U. S. Air Force's Scientific Advisory Board. In the midst of World War II the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, Henry H. "Hap" Arnold grasped the absolutely essential relationship between post-war science and national security. To realize his objective of inextricably linking science to air power, he called upon his friend, the brilliant Hungarian physicistTheodore von Karman, to assess and predict the future of military aeronautics. In Where We Stand and in Science, the Key to Air Supremacy, Karman and his hand-picked staff devised a multidisciplinary approach to preserving the technical advantage gained by U. S. air power during the war. Both of these seminal reports are herein reprinted. Although the Cold War has ended and the imperatives of national security have changed radically, the basic technological conditions whichinformed both Arnold and Karman remain the same. Now as then, the capacity exists for sudden and devastating attack on the American continent. Now as then, a large commitment must be made to research which renders the skies safe from aggressors and enables the national command structure to project air power at great distances. Now as then, the boldness and imagination of the nation's scientists and engineers must be harnessed to defend American security. The history of the Scientific Advisory Board's first half century offers the encouragement and examplethat such needs can be met and that the future of democracy can be secured in large measure by the mobilization of American science and technology in service to the global air and space power of the United States Air Force.

Reflections on Research and Development in the United States Air Force was intended to be part of the now-defunct Warrior Series. While the necessity for that particular series has lapsed, its long-term goal remains valid-to produce books which will appeal to all levels of Air Force people, who may learn from the past and perhaps apply the experiences of past generations to the present. This publication should interest readers who have scant familiarity with research and development, as well as those intimately familiar with the subject. The former will gain an understanding of the outline history of Air Force research and development, while the latter will obtain fresh, personal perspectives. In 1982 General Lew Allen, Jr. called for "the continuing study of military history, combat leadership, the principles of war, and particularly, the applications of air power." All of us in the Air Force community can benefit from such study and reflection. The challenges of today and the future demand no less.